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Introduction
Welcome to the third volume of Cal State San Bernardino’s history
journal, History in the Making. The history journal is a studentedited journal with submissions from undergraduate and graduate
students at California State University, San Bernardino. The
editorial board strives to publish work that presents the reader with
unique and important topics in history that appeal to a wide
audience. This year’s journal also includes three exhibit reviews
from museums around southern California, including large
traveling exhibits and local permanent exhibits.
Our first article, by Mark Ocegueda, is an award-winning article
that uncovers an important piece of local history. Lopez v.
Seccombe tells the story of an important San Bernardino court case
involving desegregation that was influential in creating precedent
for the famous national desegregation case Brown v. The Board of
Education. Mr. Ocegueda’s original research and photographs help
bring to life early twentieth century San Bernardino, while at the
same time recognizing the unsung heroes of this important legal
battle.
Our next article, by Cherice Estes, examines the role that the
western media had in spreading disinformation about the Rwandan
genocide in the 1990’s. The article emphasizes the power that the
western media has, and how important it is to use that power
responsibly, particularly in times of crisis. Ms. Estes also forces us
to rethink common misconceptions about events in Africa and how
we view African politics.
Our third article, by Alicia Gutierrez, is a fascinating look into the
history of the Seventh Day Adventist church and their role as
conscientious objectors and non-combatant military personnel
throughout the history of the United States from the Civil War to
the present. Ms. Gutierrez provides us with important details about
the history of the church’s role in the military and its ties to
medical experimentation.
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Our final article, by Adam Miller, is a detailed account of the
flooding issues experienced by communities in southern California
throughout the twentieth century, in particular the flood of 1938.
Mr. Miller emphasizes the importance of flood control for the
industrial and residential development of southern California;
without which many southern California landmarks could not
exist. Mr. Miller’s article also includes many photographs as
evidence of the enormity of the destruction caused by flooding in
southern California’s history.
Concluding this volume of History in the Making are three exhibit
reviews highlighting three themes: local museums, social
resistance and women in the west.
Please enjoy the 2010 volume of History in the Making.
Oceana Collins
Chief Editor
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Lopez v. Seccombe:
The City of San Bernardino’s Mexican American
Defense Committee and Its Role in Regional and
National Desegregation
BY MARK OCEGUEDA
ABSTRACT: This

article examines Lopez v. Seccombe, one of the
earliest successful desegregation court cases in United States
history. The legal challenge was decided in 1944 in the City of San
Bernardino, California and desegregated city parks and
recreational facilities, specifically the Perris Hill “plunge” or
pool. The decision of this case set precedent for other local
desegregation challenges, including the much more celebrated
Mendez v. Westminster decision in 1947, and eventually had
influence on the landmark Supreme Court decision of Brown v.
Board of Education in 1954. This study will focus on the Mexican
American barrio in San Bernardino’s Westside, the city’s Mexican
American Defense Committee, and the city’s discriminatory
policies against Mexican Americans that eventually led to the legal
challenge. Such an examination contributes to historians’
understanding of segregation and the eventual legal victories in
desegregation by situating the social aspects that surrounded
Lopez v. Seccombe. More attention should be paid not only to the
cases that led to the landmark case of Brown v. Board, but also to
the context in which these cases developed. Major Supreme Court
decisions rarely come to pass suddenly; they usually arise through
a long journey of precedents and legal challenges that force an
evolution in legal philosophy. Mexican American communities
played a unique role in desegregating their communities and
contributed toward the national process of desegregation through
legislative and judicial means.
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On August 1, 1943, the Mexican American Defense Committee of
San Bernardino held a meeting to discuss strategies to combat
discriminatory practices Mexicans and Mexican Americans faced
on a daily basis in the city of San Bernardino, California. During
this period, Mexican children in San Bernardino could only attend
segregated schools, and the Mexican population of San Bernardino
could only use public pools on Sunday, the day before the pools
were drained and cleaned. The Mexican American Defense
Committee met at San Jose Hall on Fifth Street and Pico Avenue.
Eugenio Nogueras, Mexican American Defense Committee
organizer and editor for a local Spanish language newspaper, El
Sol de San Bernardino, presided over the meeting.1 The members
at the meeting decided to confront the city about the explicit role it
played in the inequitable and discriminatory treatment that
Mexicans living in the Westside barrio, specifically along Mount
Vernon Avenue, suffered due to the City’s segregation policies. On
August 19th, the Mexican American Defense Committee sent a
letter to Mayor W.C. Seccombe and the City Council demanding
that Mexicans be allowed to use the municipal pool at Perris Hill
Park. The letter had local support, including that of Tommy
Richardson, the City Recreation Supervisor for baseball games
held on Mount Vernon Avenue. When the City rejected the
Defense Committee’s demands, Ignacio Lopez, editor of El
Espectador, another local Spanish language newspaper, and
members of the Mexican American Defense Committee filed a
class action lawsuit against the Mayor and the City Council.2
The results of the ensuing court case, known as Lopez v.
Seccombe, served as legal precedent for future court cases,
especially the landmark Mendez v. Westminster, a school
desegregation case that took place in Orange County in 1947. The
San Bernardino case successfully desegregated local parks, pools,
and recreational facilities in the City on grounds that segregation
was unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
1

Mario T. Garcia, Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology, and Identity,
1930-1960 (London: Yale University Press, 1989), 88.
2
Retired professor Manuel R. Delgado writes about growing up in his
hometown of San Bernardino in The Last Chicano. Manuel Delgado, The Last
Chicano: A Mexican American Experience (Bloomington, Indiana: Author
House Press, 2009), 13.
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– one of the first times that the argument was used to desegregate a
public facility other than a school. Specifically, the Lopez case
used the argument that the Mexican community paid taxes for
public parks and recreational sites and should benefit equally from
those publicly-funded facilities. Before analyzing the significance
of these court cases in-depth, it is important first to examine the
conditions that led to Lopez v. Seccombe.
Looks Like Mexico’s Moved In! The Westside barrio of San
Bernardino
During the 1880s, San Bernardino became a significant trading
center with the establishment of railroads. By the early twentieth
century, the Santa Fe railroad began to double-track its line as
citrus groves and irrigation became more prominent in San
Bernardino. As these industries grew, there was a greater need for
unskilled labor that included ditch diggers, track workers, and fruit
pickers. Since Anglos3 filled the skilled labor positions, Mexicans
were recruited to work menial labor jobs because they were seen
by employers as “tractable, easily moved, and willing to work for
low wages.”4 San Bernardino’s Santa Fe Railroad Depot, the
nearby city of Colton’s Southern Pacific Railroad operation, and
the growing citrus industry, which had boomed throughout the
towns of inland Southern California during the 1880s, all
demanded an unskilled labor force. At the time, Mexicans,
Italians, blacks, and Chinese mostly served as the unskilled labor
force in San Bernardino. Chinese exclusion played a role in
transforming the Westside into an almost exclusive Mexican
3

I will use the term Anglos throughout this work to refer to white Americans,
specifically those of Anglo-Saxon descent. In the historiography of Mexican
American history, the term Anglo has been used constantly to discern white
Anglo-Saxon Americans from Irish or Eastern European immigrants, because
“white” identity at the time was still being developed. Additionally, the terms of
“Mexican” and “Mexican American” are used to differentiate Mexican
immigrants and Mexican Americans, whose constitutional rights theoretically
should have been protected. At times the term “Mexican” will just be used to
refer to both Mexicans and Mexican Americans.
4
Ruth Tuck, Not With the Fist (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company,
1946), 38.

3

Lopez vs. Seccombe

barrio. As Chinese residents moved out of the Westside of San
Bernardino, an influx of new Mexican immigrants filled vacant
jobs that were left as the number of Chinese immigrant laborers
declined. As a result of the shifting demographics of laboring
populations, the segregated Westside of the city along Mount
Vernon Avenue became home to a concentrated population of
Mexicans.
The combination of various factors, such as geographical
proximity of Mexico to the Southwest and San Bernardino, lowpaying labor positions that were available to Mexicans, and
volatile political conditions in Mexico all provided push and pull
factors for Mexicans to continue migrating into the inland
Southern California region. The Southwest’s adjacency to Mexico
made it convenient for employers to recruit Mexicans for
temporary positions. Employers took advantage of existing cyclical
migration patterns and reinforced them while at the same time
ignoring the role that they played in perpetuating a lack of
permanence among Mexican laboring populations. They both
enjoyed the benefits of having access to a temporary labor pool
and chided Mexicans for their lack of permanence. This sentiment
proved to be prevalent among Anglos in San Bernardino where in
the initial stages of the Mexican migration northward they,
according to anthropologist Ruth Tuck, “cherished the illusion that
its new Mexican population was not going to be very permanent.
Some day when the work was all done, they would ‘go home.’”5
Moreover, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed the
emergence of American employment agencies that would enter
Mexico and recruit workers for U.S. labor purposes. Anglo labor
recruiters would also be located in border towns, such as El Paso,
where they provided Mexican workers with low-paying labor jobs
on railroads, in factories, and on farms throughout the Southwest,
including San Bernardino. 6
Factors that pushed Mexican migration north included the
unstable economic and political conditions in Mexico. Mexico
5

Tuck, Not With the Fist, 39.
George J. Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and
Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York: Oxford University
Press 1993), 20.
6
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during the nineteenth century had been ravaged by constant wars
and political and ideological instability that failed to unite the
nation and establish a stable economy. During President Porfirio
Díaz’s reign (1876-1911), agrarian reforms left thousands of
Mexican peasants landless. The transition to exporting food crops
also severely decreased the supply of Mexico’s staple foods and
inflated their prices, causing many peasants in Mexico to live on
the brink of starvation. Landless and without food, thousands of
Mexican peasants were compelled to join the migration northward
in order to survive.7 One of the major historical events that pushed
Mexicans north was the 1910 Mexican Revolution. Many
Mexicans fled the country to escape the chaos and violence of the
revolution. Manuel Delgado, a native of San Bernardino, recalled
his grandmother’s journey to San Bernardino:
During… the revolution of 1910, Mexico was a
dangerous place, especially for beautiful young
women, so Mama Lupe was sent to live… with
friends in the United States. She came first to
Albuquerque, New Mexico… and, in 1921, moved
to San Bernardino’s Mt. Vernon district.8
Violence and political instability in Mexico remained on-going
factors that caused Mexicans to emigrate north into the towns and
cities of the Southwest including San Bernardino.
Although there had already been an established Mexican
community in San Bernardino before large numbers of new
migrants arrived, the continued influx of significant numbers of
new Mexican immigrants contributed to the development of a
well-established, self-contained Mexican barrio. Between 1890
and 1900, San Bernardino’s census recorded 69 foreign-born
Mexican residents; however, by 1910 the city had experienced
exponential growth and recorded 888 foreign-born Mexicans in
San Bernardino. By 1930, census figures continued to mark an
increase of foreign-born Mexican residents and recorded nearly
2,500 Mexicans living in the City.9 An Anglo resident living in
7

Sanchez, 20.
Delgado, 2-3.
9
Tuck, 38.
8
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San Bernardino during this period of growth stated the following
about the growing Mexican population:
I was working near the depot on a grading job and I
used to see them getting off the cars. I’d seen
Mexicans all my life but these sure looked different.
Half of ‘em had blankets on and sandals on their
feet. Some of ‘em wore funny big hats and some
wore funny little ones. There were women with
their arms full of babies and bundles. They’d mill
around and jabber all excited, for a while, and then
they’d stand still and look scared… there were a lot
of them! I said to my partner, ‘Looks like Mexico’s
moved in!’10
The influx of Mexican immigrants into the Southwest and their
eventual establishment in the barrios would set the stage for
segregation. As the description above makes clear, AngloAmericans’ attitudes toward the existing population of Mexican
Americans were shaped by the large influxes of new Mexican
migrants and their perceptions that these immigrants represented
not only a non-white population but also a distinctly foreign class
of people.
Throughout the decades from the end of the nineteenth
century into the beginning of the twentieth, pseudo-scientific views
and racial philosophies reinforced Anglo-American fears of ‘the
other’ and validated the gradual construction of racial barriers in
San Bernardino. Although racist ideas were not quite as menacing
to the Mexican in the early 1900s, historian David Gutierrez
explained that “by the mid-1920s many Americans were beginning
to conclude that Mexicans were inferior even to the lowliest
European immigrant.”11 In 1928, Congressman John Box called for
exclusion of Mexican immigrants because they were “a mixture of
Mediterranean-blooded Spanish peasant[s] with low-grade Indians
10

Tuck, 38.
David G. Gutierrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican
Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1995), 53.
11
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who did not fight to extinction but submitted and multiplied as
serfs.”12 Vanderbilt University economist Roy L. Garis also
expressed similar views held by Americans during the time and
noted that Mexicans were characterized as possessing “minds that
run to nothing higher than the animal functions--- eat, sleep, and
sexual debauchery” and that if immigration restriction did not
materialize, Americans would risk “a lowering of our standards of
morals and of our political and social ideals; the creation of a race
problem that will dwarf the negro problem of the South; and the
practical destruction, at least for centuries, of all that is worthwhile
in our white civilization.”13 These emerging racial ideologies the
Anglos developed about Mexicans would become the foundation
for justifying segregation on the local level in communities
throughout the Southwest.
As Mexicans established themselves in the San Bernardino
barrio, they soon became targets for the pseudo-scientific views of
white Americans at a period of time when racist philosophies were
at their peak in American history. For example, anthropologist
Ruth Tuck noted:
[San Bernardino]14 was immediately convinced…
that no immigrant group had ever been so ‘low’ or
so ‘dumb… The [Mexicans] were uniformly low
intelligence… (Poorly used testing devices, applied
to bi-lingual school children were later to give this
estimate a great air of ‘scientific’ validity, but it
doubtless would have been made anyway.) They
lived like animals, produced too many children,
12

John Box. “Congressman John Box Objects to Mexican Immigrants, 1928,”
quoted in Jon Gjerde, ed.: Major Problems in American Immigration and Ethnic
History (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 287.
13
Gutierrez, 54-55.
14
Note that in Ruth Tuck’s history of San Bernardino, Not With The Fist, she
referred to the city as “Descanso” in order to fulfill a theoretical argument in
which she asserted that a descanso “was a spot at which [Spanish] parties
stopped to refresh themselves” in the days of Spanish exploration. For the
Mexican American during the 1940s, the period in which Tuck’s work was
written, “Descanso”, or San Bernardino, could therefore represent a “stop-over
on the journey toward complete assimilation into and acculturation with
American society.” Tuck, xviii.
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wasted their earnings on drink, and never took
thought of the morrow.15
These racist views against Mexicans in San Bernardino further
help to explain why segregated policies came into practice. Anglos
would certainly want to distance themselves from Mexicans
because of these social and racial anxieties.
The Westside of San Bernardino developed into a barrio by
the late 1920s along Mount Vernon Avenue between Fifth and
Ninth streets. During the 1920s, this rural area consisted of a
mixed community of Mexicans, Italians, Chinese, and a few
Anglos. As the decade rolled along and the Mexican population
began to grow, they would further populate the Mount Vernon
district. Anglo residents, in an effort to exclude Mexicans from
settling permanently, began to call for restrictions against selling
homes to Mexicans. Anglos living north of Ninth Street appealed
to the City Council to restrict Mexican home ownership because
“property owners on both sides of 9th street had agreed to restrict
their property to whites only.” The City Council responded by
introducing policies to increase the value of homes in order to
prevent Mexicans from affording them by improving sewers,
curbs, and sidewalks.16 This provides an example of City efforts to
racially segregate residents through methods less often recognized.
The City made efforts not only to confine Mexicans to a particular
area, but began a ghettoization process of the area by improving
neighboring sections of the town to elevate property values of
white residents and economically excluding others. This is a
strong example of how segregation did not just hinder the inclusion
of others but materially uplifted the white population.

15
16

8

Tuck, 38.
Delgado, 7.
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Figure 1. Mount Vernon Avenue facing North during the 1950s. San
Bernardino, CA, (Courtesy of Manuel Delgado).

Once the influx of Mexican residents could not be
prevented in the Mount Vernon district, city officials soon
neglected the area. For example, in 1947, more than 650 residents
signed a petition to add stop signs and appropriate traffic lights
along Mount Vernon Avenue because of traffic incidents that had
resulted in multiple deaths of residents in the Mount Vernon
district.17 This neglect to protect the security of residents could
also be seen in 1944, when G.E. Carlson ran for city council in San
Bernardino’s Fifth Ward, which contained the Mount Vernon
district. Carlson commented on the underdevelopment of the
Mount Vernon district and lack of security provided by City
officials:
The… district needs more police and fire protection.
The merchants and responsible people of that area
want it. Mt. Vernon is a main artery of
transcontinental traffic [referring to Route 66 that
ran along the district] and lacks adequate police
protection. We have a problem of juvenile
irresponsibility in this ward. Restrictive measures
alone will not cure it. This problem deserves
17

Ignacio Lopez, El Espectador, 13, no. 18 (May 23, 1947), California
Polytechnic University, Pomona Microfilm.
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solving at its source--- that is adequate recreational
and other facilities to take care of excess energies of
young people. Where is the plunge18 that was
promised this ward?19
The comments that G.E. Carlson provided about the Mount
Vernon district suggested that city officials neglected the area
through a variety of means: lack of development, refusal to provide
adequate recreational facilities, and a lack of police and
firefighters. The fact that Ignacio Lopez and the Mexican
American Defense Committee chose segregation in recreational
facilities as the focus of their lawsuit against the city is significant
when placed in context of their overall battle for equitable
treatment. In other words, the case of Lopez v. Seccombe was not
only about desegregation but also about the fact that the City had
completely neglected the Mount Vernon neighborhood in nearly
every respect.
Another effort to exclude Mexicans in the Mount Vernon
district from city development came in 1956 with the construction
of Interstate 215. Two important off-ramps, according to Manuel
Delgado, “at 5th Street and Baseline, [led] to Downtown, away
from the barrio” and “effectively diverted all the traffic from
Route 66 and the businesses along Mt. Vernon Avenue.”20 The
building of the freeway cut off economic opportunities for
Mexicans in the Mount Vernon district by diverting potential
consumers into the downtown area. In addition, Mexicans would
also experience restricted economic mobility as the jobs available
to them paid low wages. Low-paying positions at the Santa Fe
Railroad, agricultural labor jobs, and other menial labor offered
minimum wages to Mexicans with no benefits. As the barrio
became increasingly Mexican, the city used various methods to
further segregate Mexicans into the Mount Vernon district and
eventually prevented any development in the area by funneling
economic development into other sections of the City. A pattern of
18

Swimming pool.
San Bernardino Sun, 1944. California State University, San Bernardino
Microfilm.
20
Delgado, 1.
19
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economic neglect would contribute towards the Mexican American
Defense Committee’s demands for justice on behalf of San
Bernardino’s Mexican residents.
City officials also segregated the African American
residents of San Bernardino. Most African Americans were located
in the southern section of San Bernardino off of Waterman Avenue
known as the Valley Truck Farms area. When accusations of
deliberate residential exclusion of blacks arose, real estate
developers responded by stating that the sale of lots had no
restrictions on the homes and that any race could buy; however,
according to Ruth Tuck, they “were fully aware that without the
restriction, whites would not risk buying a lot for fear of having a
black neighbor.”21 Tuck also noted that the housing segregation
for African Americans was severe; blacks were confined to certain
areas in southern San Bernardino and many would never consider
buying or renting a home in the northern part of town where whites
primarily lived. In addition, employment was also severely
restricted as blacks were channeled into menial service trades, such
as porters, elevator operators, dish washers, and other cheap labor
positions.22 By the late 1920s, the City of San Bernardino had
established a racially divided city. Mexicans lived in the Westside
barrio along Mount Vernon Avenue, African Americans were
living in the Southern section known as the Truck Valley Farms
area, and Anglos lived primarily in the northern part of the city.
The plight of the African Americans in San Bernardino is useful
for comprehending the injustices the City committed against ethnic
minorities and helps to explain why opposition to those injustices
emerged.
It should also be noted that many Mexicans preferred to
live in the barrio. According to historian Albert Camarillo, the
barrio allowed the Mexican American communities of the
Southwest to function “within a closed Mexican social universe.
Faced with their new-found status as a segregated minority and
confronted by a hostile outside world, the Mexican community
entered a phase of social change and adaptation… [that] ensured

21
22

Delgado, 7.
Tuck, 46.
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the continuity of Mexican society” in California.23 This positive
aspect of the segregated barrio, as David Gutierrez has
persuasively argued, allowed Mexican Americans to:
Transform Anglo Americans’ efforts to stigmatize
them as racial inferiors into a positive strategy of
self-affirmation as Mexicans in American society.
At the same time, Mexican Americans’ success in
generating such new bases for solidarity went a long
way toward guaranteeing the survival and growth of
a distinct, if syncretic, variant of Mexican culture in
what had become part of the United States. This
was the last thing the proponents of Manifest
Destiny had in mind when they had predicted the
eventual fading away of the region’s ethnic
population… Americans planted the seeds of
continuing ethnic discord in the region.24
If the barrio allowed for the survival and growth of the Mexicans
and for a strategy of self-affirmation as Gutierrez contends, then it
would almost certainly lead to a path of resistance against
discriminatory Anglo policies. As racial hostilities increased,
Mexican Americans found power in solidarity and through the
maintenance of their own communities. The persistence and even
the growth of barrios throughout the Southwest was not merely a
function of white racism against Mexicans but a strategic defense
on the part of Mexican Americans. This helped give rise to the
Mexican American Defense Committee in San Bernardino and to
leaders like Eugenio Nogueras and Ignacio Lopez who pushed the
legal envelope in an effort to overturn discriminatory practices.

23

Albert M. Camarillo, Chicanos in a Changing Society: From Mexican
Pueblos to American Barrios in Santa Barbara and Southern California, 18481930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 53-54, quoted in Gutierrez,
Walls and Mirrors, 22.
24
Gutierrez, Walls and Mirrors, 37-38.

12

Mark Ocegueda

School Segregation in San Bernardino and Early Resistance by the
Mexican American Community
In addition to being economically excluded and residentially
segregated, Mexicans living in San Bernardino and other towns in
the inland region of Southern California suffered from typical
forms of segregation as well, such as segregation in schools. In
1874, newly arriving Anglos in Riverside, a town in inland
Southern California, created the Trujillo School District to serve
the Mexican community of La Placita. The Riverside City School
Board maintained that all children must attend the school in the
attendance precinct in which they lived. The school board’s ruling
was a response to the increasing Mexican immigrant families that
worked the line crews of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific
Railroad and the subsequent increased enrollment of immigrant
children within Riverside schools. 25 The Riverside City School
board would reaffirm this decision again in 1906. The Casa Blanca
School of Riverside provides evidence of early educational
discriminatory policies against Mexicans and an example of
segregation through means of residential exclusion. The Trujillo
school district in Riverside was not alone in inland Southern
California and the Southwest with its discriminatory educational
policies. By the mid -1930s, roughly 85 percent of school districts
in the Southwest were segregated.26
Another example of school segregation in the inland region
of Southern California can be seen in Ontario. In 1921, Chaffee
Union High School Superintendant, Merton Hill, recommended
that a new school site be built for Mexican children in the

25

National Park Service, “Five Views: An Ethnic Historic Site Survey for
California (Mexican Americans): A History of Mexican Americans in
California: Casa Blanca School,”
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/5views/5views5h10.htm
(accessed June 11, 2009).
26
Gilbert G. Gonzalez, “The System of Public Education and Its Function
Within the Chicano Communities, 1910-1930” (Ph.D. diss., University of
California, Los Angeles, 1974), quoted in Gilbert G. Gonzalez, Chicano
Education in the Era of Segregation (Philadelphia: The Balch Institute Press,
1990), 20-21.
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southeastern part of Ontario.27 In addition, the San Bernardino Sun
reported in 1922 that
Children living west of Euclid Avenue and north of
Fifth Avenue should attend school at San Antonio
building. Children living east of Euclid Avenue and
north of Southern Pacific Railroad should attend
school at Central building. All other children,
except Mexicans, in the Ontario School district,
should attend school at South Euclid building.
Mexican pupils in the first three grades will report
to Sultana school.28
These examples show clearly that during the early twentieth
century, segregation was intrinsically linked to residential
segregation in the inland region of Southern California. Historian
Gilbert G. Gonzalez has further commented on the issue and stated
that:
As the pattern of Mexican residential segregation
into colonias developed, school segregation
followed… segregation reflected and recreated the
social divisions within the larger society formed by
residential segregation, labor and wage rate
differentials, political inequality, socioeconomic
disparities, and racial oppression… Education for
the Mexican community therefore meant change as
well as the preservation of their subordination.29
Mexicans in inland Southern California and San Bernardino had
thus been structurally separated into a group of people who had
been cut off geographically, excluded from city services, and
27
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separated in public schools. This amounted to total segregation for
Mexicans and depicts the depth of discrimination that Mexicans
experienced in San Bernardino and the Southwest.
In San Bernardino, events surrounding Ramona Elementary
in the Mount Vernon barrio provide early examples of resistance
by the Mexican community towards discriminatory educational
policies. In 1926, a new site was built for Ramona Elementary
school. The fifth grade students that attended the old Ramona
Elementary school building were excited about the prospect of
attending Sturgis Junior High School in downtown San Bernardino
after completing the sixth grade. They had been particularly
excited about attending school with Anglo students for the first
time. After graduating from Ramona Elementary, school officials
notified their parents that the district planned to hold back the
students of Ramona Elementary for one more year because of
supposed overcrowding at Sturgis Junior High School, forcing
them to repeat the sixth grade. The parents, students, and some
teachers protested before the school board to let the sixth grade
students enter Sturgis Junior High School; however, the sixth grade
students would have to repeat the same grade at Ramona
Elementary the following year.30 Although the Mexican
community of San Bernardino did not succeed in getting their
children reassigned from Ramona Elementary to Sturgis Junior
High School, they would prove to be the first Mexican Americans
to resist unequal policies in the city.
Additionally, when the new Ramona Elementary site was
built in 1926, school officials built it to serve as a vocational
training site for Mexican students that would “lead to habits of
thrift and industry, and to the ability to make necessary contacts
with the industrial world.” 31 Vocational education would be
offered to Mexican children through fourth and sixth grades. This
educational experiment remained in practice through the 19311932 school year. School officials believed that vocational training
benefitted Mexican school children because Mexican pupils were,
according to school officials, “becoming retarded in academic
30
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subjects” and “vocational opportunities [might] open [them to]
become interested in remaining in school in order to make
furniture or cook and sew.”32 Gilbert Gonzales has also noted that
educators who advocated segregation supported vocational training
that could Americanize the children in a controlled cultural and
linguistic atmosphere and train them for occupations that Anglos
considered best suited for them.33 Ramona Elementary offers an
example of the effort to provide vocational training in a segregated
environment.

Figure 2. Ramona Elementary Class photo, 1947. San Bernardino, CA,
(Courtesy of Manuel Delgado).

One justification for segregating Mexican students in San
Bernardino dealt specifically with language. As Mexicans became
demographic minorities to Anglos in the decades following the end
of the U.S.-Mexico War in 1848, English became the primary
language used in the political, economic, and educational realms.
In 1923, the San Bernardino Sun reported that County
Superintendent Ida M. Collins would give “the study of English…
32
33
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special emphasis during the 1923-24 scholastic year.”34 Collins
justified segregation of Mexican children on the grounds that the
Spanish-English language barrier impeded their learning
capabilities and separation was necessary in order to help the
children learn English. In 1929, students, parents, and the Mexican
consulate protested unsuccessfully to Collins concerning the
school board’s efforts to segregate Mexican and black children at
De Olivera Elementary School.35 Just as in 1926, when students
and parents protested against holding the sixth grade Mexican
students back a year, the Mexican community once again
responded in a unified effort to prevent further discriminatory
policies from being implemented.
The reasons for the segregation of Mexican students had
deeper underlying causes than just an English-Spanish language
barrier. One of the prominent writers on Mexican American
education, George I. Sanchez, concluded that Anglos believed
“that a foreign home language is a handicap, that somehow
children with Spanish as a mother tongue were doomed to failure-- in fact, they were, ipso facto, less than normally intelligent.”36
Indeed, one of the reasons Anglos segregated Mexican children
had to do with racial stereotypes that cast Mexicans as inferior and
less intelligent. In 1920, a San Bernardino school teacher stated
that segregation of Mexican children resulted from public opinions
within the Anglo community that was “based largely on the theory
that the Mexican is a menace to the health and morals of the rest of
the community.”37 In addition, Chaffee Union Superintendent
Merton Hill justified segregation on grounds “that Mexican
children advance more rapidly when grouped by themselves,” and
thus profited “most by the instruction offered in such classes.”38
34

San Bernardino Sun, March 25, 1923. California State University, San
Bernardino Microfilm.
35
Francisco A. Rosales, Chicano! The History of the Mexican American Civil
Rights Movement (Houston: Arte Público Press, 1996), 70.
36
George I. Sanchez, History Culture and Education quoted in Julian Samora,
ed.: La Raza: Forgotten Americans, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1966), 15.
37
Gracey C. Stanley, “Special Schools for Mexicans.” The Survey 44
(September 15, 1920), 714 quoted in Gonzalez, Chicano Education, 24.
38
Merton E. Hill, Development of An Americanization Program (Ontario, Calif.:
Union High School District, 1928) quoted in Gonzalez, Chicano Education, 24.

17

Lopez vs. Seccombe

These examples illustrate that many Anglo educators considered
separate education beneficial to the Mexican community; however,
according to Gilbert Gonzalez, “these shallow arguments masked
the same prejudices that motivated the overt racists.”39 Arguments,
such as language barriers and the underlying racist reasons all
intertwined to create the segregation policies in San Bernardino
that would meet resistance from the Mexican American
community.
The resistance to Ramona’s sixth grade students’ injustice
and the incident between Superintendent Ida Collins and the
Mexican parents in San Bernardino served as early examples of
community resistance against discriminatory policies. Another
example of resistance would occur again in 1940, when the
registrar at Mount Vernon Elementary refused to enroll children at
the school on the basis of language and race. Manuel Delgado
recalled a confrontation between his tía Agapita and the registrar at
Mount Vernon Elementary when her niece’s children had been
denied enrollment into the school:
Tía Agapita: I want to enroll my niece in this school.
Registrar: I can’t accept them here because Mexican
children have to go to Ramona
Elementary.
Tía Agapita: But I see some Mexican kids out there.
Registrar: They speak English already. Besides,
they live in this district.
Tía Agapita: Well, my niece speaks English too and
we also live in this district.
Registrar: I’m sorry.
After this discussion, Agapita asked to see the Principal and the
registrar eventually acquiesced and stated that Agapita’s niece
could be enrolled only if she was to be helped with her studies in
order to keep up with the other children.40 These types of
occurrences that surrounded Ramona Elementary School from the
1920s into the 1940s would eventually contribute to the formation
39
40
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of Mexican American self-help organizations that would seek to
achieve civil rights for the Mexican community in San Bernardino.
Ignacio Lopez and San Bernardino’s Legal Challenge for Civil
Rights, Lopez v. Seccombe (1944)
The movement to desegregate parks and recreational facilities in
San Bernardino began in 1943 when John H. Milor, Principal of
Alessandro Junior High School, stated that racial prejudice against
Mexicans by whites was a real problem in the city. He blamed
segregated parks and pools for the recent outbreak of San
Bernardino’s own Zoot Suit gangs, similar to those that emerged in
Los Angeles. Milor also advocated the building of another pool for
Mexicans in the Mount Vernon barrio because of their nonadmittance into the Perris Hill Park Pool.41 Mexicans at this time
were only allowed to swim in city pools on Sundays, the day
before the pool was drained and cleaned. Shortly after Milor’s
statements, Eugenio Nogueras held the Mexican American
Defense Committee meeting on August 1, 1943, that would send a
letter to the City Council demanding Mexicans’ admittance into
the pool at Perris Hill Park. The letter was supported by various
members of the Mexican community including Father Joseph
Nuñez and Ignacio Lopez, editor of El Espectador.
Father Joseph Nuñez had crossed into the United States in
1926 from Zacatecas, Mexico, a place from which many Mexicans
in the San Bernardino barrio had also emigrated. Nuñez took over
Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church on Pico and Spruce Street
in 1937 and quickly became an outspoken leader for Mexican
American struggles against injustices in San Bernardino.42 A
specific incident with Father Nuñez contributed toward the
Mexican American Defense Committee’s demand to desegregate
parks and recreational facilities in the city. Ignacio Lopez wrote:
“Last Tuesday afternoon Reverend J.R. Nuñez and three of the
Mexican children of his parish were refused admittance to the San
Bernardino Municipal Plunge because they were Mexicans… They
were refused the use of a swimming pool which displays a bronze
41
42
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plaque that says ‘no one is to be refused admittance because of
race or color,’ and which was built with WPA [Works Progress
Administration] money.”43 When the city council rejected the
Mexican American Defense Committee’s demands, Ignacio Lopez
and other leaders of San Bernardino’s Mexican community filed a
class action lawsuit against the city of San Bernardino.

Figure 3. Ignacio Lopez and El Espectadr44

Ignacio Lopez was born in Guadalajara, Mexico in 1908
and raised in the United States. Lopez, from 1933 until 1961, ran
El Espectador, his weekly Spanish language newspaper that served
the Mexican residents of inland Southern California towns. El
Espectador assisted Mexicans in fighting for greater civil rights on
many fronts, such as: political integration, housing equality, school
desegregation, and police brutality against Mexican Americans.
Lopez would also help form the Unity Leagues in Southern
California and vigorously encouraged civic participation by
Mexican Americans because, as Mario García has noted:

43
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López spoke more for the attainment of the fruits of
the American Revolution than the Mexican
Revolution. Hence the concept or sense of
permanency [among Mexican Americans]--- the
United States being the home country--- and the
recognition that one was an American citizen with
all the rights pertaining to such citizenship strongly
influenced the political ideology and activism of
Mexican Americans.45

Figure 4. Ignacio Lopez, September 16, 194546

Ignacio Lopez also helped to mobilize the Mexican
American community by calling them to action. When a case of
police brutality occurred in San Bernardino in the late 1940s,
Lopez publicized the case against police officer John Epps for his
role in the wrongful death of San Bernardino resident Ramon Rios.
When talking about the death of Ramon Rios, Ignacio Lopez
declared that “Johnnie Epps is not to blame,” but that the “guilty
ones are all of us, who permit the police to become executioners of
those they are supposed to serve…. We are the criminals.”47
45
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Constant calls to action by Lopez helped mobilize Mexican
Americans in San Bernardino and other Mexican communities in
Southern California.
On September 1, 1943, Ignacio Lopez announced that he
had contacted the nationally known civil rights lawyer and former
United States Presidential candidate Wendell Willkie to represent
the Mexican American Defense Committee.48 Willkie, however,
refused to take the case. Instead, Los Angeles based attorney
David C. Marcus agreed to represent San Bernardino’s Mexican
community. On September 17, 1943, Marcus filed a class action
lawsuit against San Bernardino Mayor W.C. Seccombe and the
city council. The petitioners in the Lopez v. Seccombe case
included Ignacio Lopez, Eugenio Nogueras, Father Nuñez,
Virginia Prado, and Rafael Muñoz. Marcus made the argument that
as tax payers and United States citizens, the Mexican Americans of
San Bernardino were entitled to use parks and recreational
facilities within the city and that non-admittance was
unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.49
Mayor Seccombe denied the allegations and stated that under the
city charter, the Mayor and City Council had the legislative
“authority to acquire, own and maintain public libraries, common
museums, gymnasiums, parks and baths.”50 Presiding Judge Leon
Yanckwich ruled on behalf of San Bernardino’s Mexican
American Defense Committee and declared that segregation of
swimming pools and other recreational facilities was
unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. On
February 5, 1944 Judge Yanckwich concluded:

48

Delgado, 14.
Lopez v. Seccombe. Records of the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of California, RG 21. Southern California Central Division
(Los Angeles). Civil Case Files 1938-1969. National Archives and Records
Administration Pacific Region (Laguna Niguel), box 578, folder 3158.
50
Lopez v. Seccombe, Defense, paragraphs I-III, 3. Records of the District
Court of the United States for the Southern District of California, RG 21.
Southern California Central Division (Los Angeles). Civil Case Files 19381969. National Archives and Records Administration Pacific Region (Laguna
Niguel), box 578, folder 3158.
49

22

Mark Ocegueda

That respondents' conduct is illegal and is in
violation of petitioners’ rights and privileges as
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States… as particularly provided under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. That petitioners are
entitled to such equal accommodations, advantages,
and privileges and to equal rights and treatment
with other persons as citizens of the United States,
in the use and enjoyment of the facilities of said
park.51
At last, the organizing and resistance against discrimination paid
off when Judge Yanckwich ruled in favor of the San Bernardino
Mexican American Defense Committee. This was only the second
case where a judge ruled against the segregation of Mexican
Americans and the first case in which a judge did so with regards
to public facilities other than schools. The Lopez v. Seccombe case
thus marked a significant victory for San Bernardino and for all
Mexican Americans fighting for similar rights throughout the
Southwest.
After the case, an article in El Espectador stated that the
legal victory resulted from the San Bernardino Mexican American
Defense Committee’s efforts to eliminate discriminatory policies.
The article also noted that the City Council decided shortly
thereafter to have San Bernardino merchants remove signs from
their windows that stated “White Trade Only.”52 The Lopez
decision marked the first time in history that the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was used to uphold the rights
of Mexican Americans.53 This court case was a landmark decision
for Mexican residents in San Bernardino and would later be used
in the judgment of Mendez v. Westminster, one of the most
significant court cases leading up to the Supreme Court’s Brown v.
Board of Education (1954), which ended de jure racial segregation
in public schools.
51
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Lopez v. Seccombe’s Influence on Mendez v. Westminster (1947)
and National Desegregation
On March 2, 1945, attorney David C. Marcus filed a lawsuit on
behalf of Gonzalo and Felícitas Mendez against the Westminster
School District in Orange County, California. Gonzalo, born in
Mexico, had become a U.S. citizen and had resided in California
since the age of six. His wife, Felícitas, was born in Puerto Rico
and therefore entitled to U.S. citizenship as well. The Mendez
family experienced a similar incident to that of Agapita when she
tried to enroll her niece’s children into Mount Vernon Elementary
in 1940. When the Mendez family attempted to enroll their three
children into a local school, school authorities denied them
admission because of their dark skin and Mexican last name.
Gonzalo’s sister, however, was able to gain admission for her
children because they were fairer skinned and had the less evident
Mexican surname of “Vidaurri.” School officials informed the
Mendez family that the children would have to attend the school
established for Mexicans in another part of town. 54
Soon after the incident, an outraged Gonzalo Mendez
consulted attorney David C. Marcus, who had just won the Lopez
v. Seccombe case in 1944. Marcus accepted the Orange County
legal challenge because of its similarities to Lopez. He believed he
could win using the same type of Fourteenth Amendment
argument used in San Bernardino. The following is a discussion
from the Mendez v. Westminster pre-trial between David C.
Marcus and Federal Court Judge Paul J. McCormick, which
brought the San Bernardino case into question:
The Court: I have been thinking a good deal about
the procedure in this case. The case seems to be, as
far as I can discover, sui generis. I don’t believe
54
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there is any case in the books that parallels this
case… I was hopeful that there might be some
appeal to the State court primarily instead of
bringing the case to the Federal Court ab initio.
Counsel doesn’t seem disposed to do that. The
complaint did state a case, I think, under the
modernized method of pleading in civil actions in
the Federal Court. For that reason I thought that the
motion to dismiss was not well taken. I will think
that is true, but I was hopeful when I permitted the
amicus curiae to come into the case that they would
help us some. Instead of being friends of the Court,
they seem to be onlookers. We have been trying to
formulate some method whereby the time of
everybody could be conserved in a case of this kind.
Mr. Marcus: Your Honor, there was a like suit in
this court before Judge Yankwich55. The case
involved - The Court: Well, that was the case that you called
the Court’s attention to. That was a consent
judgment, as I recall it, wasn’t it?
Mr. Marcus: That was after a hearing on the
motion, your Honor.
The Court: Well, I have ruled on the motion. I have
denied the motion.
Mr. Marcus: But the motion went to the respective
capacities to sue. The same position as counsel has
taken here was taken in that. That suit was brought
by some four people on behalf of all the Mexican
people of Mexican descent in San Bernardino
County.
55
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The Court: That case wasn’t analogous to this
case.56
Despite the motion being denied during pre-trial to use the Lopez
decision as a precedent for the Mendez case, Judge McCormick
would eventually use it to justify the decision.
The final decision in Mendez came in 1946 and was the
first federal court case in the country to state that separate schools
for children of color was unconstitutional because they violated
constitutional rights provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.57
Mendez would eventually lead to the desegregation of public
schools in California. On June 14, 1947, Governor of California,
Earl Warren signed the bill to desegregate public schools. In the
concurring majority decision of the Mendez case, the Lopez
decision was mentioned to have a considerable influence on the
outcome of the Orange County case. Circuit Judge Denman wrote:
I concur in what is said in the court's opinion but
cannot agree with the omission of the consideration
of Lopez v. Seccombe, so widely discussed in the
profession… What our decision here does is to
follow the precedent of Judge Yankwich's decision
in the Lopez case… the priest and the two editors,
suing for themselves as American citizens and eight
thousand (8,000) other San Bernardino persons of
Latin descent, sought an injunction against the
mayor, councilmen, chief of police and park
superintendent for such discriminatory exclusion.
The case was tried by Judge Yankwich who ruled,
as in the instant case, that such discriminatory
barring of the class of Latin descended people
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violated the due process and equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
San Bernardino’s Mexican American Defense Committee’s efforts
three years prior to the final decision in Mendez thus had a major
influence on one of the most significant test cases in United States
history in regards to desegregating public schools.
Gilbert Gonzalez commented on Mendez’s significance and
stated that the case would be the first stage of overturning the
“separate but equal” doctrine as outlined in Plessy v. Ferguson
(1896). The effects of the decision, according to Gonzalez, “were
widespread… Mexican parents and civil rights organizations such
as LULAC and the GI Forum in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico,
and Texas, entered the campaign against school segregation shortly
thereafter.” Gonzalez also mentioned that attorneys for the
plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education would use similar
strategies to those used by Marcus in Mendez.59 Frederick Aguirre
noted Mendez’s national significance leading into Brown v. Board
of Education by stating that Chief Justice Earl Warren clearly read
and understood Judge McCormick’s decision in Mendez.
According to Aguirre, Mendez helped shape Warren’s “sense of
fairness and equity that manifested itself in the Brown case.”60
Mendez v. Westminster has only recently become
recognized for its legal significance as a test case leading into
national desegregation. Although the Lopez v. Seccombe case does
not carry the legal ramifications that Mendez had, historians should
not neglect the legacy of the Lopez court case. Attorney David C.
Marcus first utilized the Fourteenth Amendment argument that
won the Mendez case in the San Bernardino decision. Therefore,
the Lopez case helped set a precedent, even if not formally
recognized in Mendez v. Westminster, that helped pave the way
towards the Mendez decision and the eventual landmark 1954
Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of Education. The
58

Concurring decision by Circuit Judge Denman. Mendez v. Westminster, 161
F.2d 774.
59
Gilbert G. Gonzalez, Chicano Education in the Era of Segregation
(Philadelphia: The Balch Institute Press, 1990), 28-29.
60
Aguirre, Mendez v. Westminster School District: How it Affected Brown v.
Board of Education, 331.

27

Lopez vs. Seccombe

Mexican American Defense Committee’s legal challenge in 1944
deserves a higher degree of recognition and a closer analysis by
historians as it is one of the integral test cases that led towards
national desegregation and greater attainment of civil rights for
Mexican Americans. Furthermore, San Bernardino’s Mexican
American Defense Committee should also be recognized as one of
the groups that advanced the civil rights struggle for Mexican
Americans. Their courageous resistance led towards a fairer and
greater U.S. legal system and consequently a more equal and just
United States.
In addition, since the City Council mandated that ‘White
Trade Only’ signs be removed from businesses soon after the
decision, the aftermath of the Lopez case assisted in further
eliminating discrimination beyond just parks and recreational
facilities. The Mexican American Defense Committee fought
against wide scale structural exclusion that included economic
exclusion, residential covenants, and school segregation. As
recently as 2009, the City is still working to eliminate the
institutional discrimination that Mexicans in San Bernardino
experienced by correcting the effects of the 215 freeway by
redesigning off ramps that will finally lead into the Westside. The
1944 case thus was not just about segregation of parks and
recreational facilities but part of a larger effort to expose
discrimination on a broad and interconnected scale.
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The Western Media and the Portrayal of the
Rwandan Genocide
BY CHERICE JOYANN ESTES
ABSTRACT: On

December 9, 1948, the United Nations established
its Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. Genocides, however, have continued to occur, affecting
millions of people around the globe. The 1994 genocide in
Rwanda resulted in an estimated 800,000 deaths. Global leaders
were well aware of the atrocities, but failed to intervene. At the
same time, the Western media's reports on Rwanda tended to
understate the magnitude of the crisis. This paper explores the
Western media's failure to accurately interpret and describe the
Rwandan Genocide. Recognizing the outside media’s role in
mischaracterizations of the Rwanda situation is particularly useful
when attempting to understand why western governments were
ineffective in their response to the atrocity. The media is selfevidently a central tool in informing the public about issues,
shaping public opinion, and promoting change within societies.
Despite the objectivity that the media is expected to maintain, there
is no denying that the media, whether intentionally or not, has
occasionally reported on events and issues in ways that have
misled or been misinterpreted by the public. The western media's
treatment of the Rwandan Genocide is a clear example of
inaccurate and incomplete news coverage.

In one hundred days, an estimated 800,000 Rwandan citizens lost
their lives, while the United States and European powers failed to
intervene. Inaccurate reports in the Western media compounded
the failure of outside governments to recognize the crisis as
genocide. Western publications circulated stories that
characterized the tragedy in Rwanda in ways that minimized the
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enormity of the event. For example the media would characterize
the situation as "a tribal war" or merely the "continuation of a civil
war."
The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the ways
the Western media described the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and
contrast those descriptions with the actual historical facts and
circumstances of Rwandan politics and social relations. Too often,
African political events that have particular and distinguishable
contexts and precedents are simply labeled as irrational tribalism,
without any attention given to the causes of a particular
occurrence.1 While journalists may attempt as best they can to be
objective when relaying information, they, like anyone else, are the
products of their training, their upbringing, their religious
affiliation, and their political and social views. And, in the case of
the Western media and Africa, the question of perspective is often
exacerbated by the relative ignorance of Western media about the
countries in Africa that they are asked to write about. Anne
Chaon, a journalist who spent time in Rwanda during the genocide,
explains that:
Most journalists are not experts in genocide. Many
of them - myself included - arrived in Rwanda with
very little knowledge of the country. So, it was
tempting, especially at the beginning, to speak of
the civil war, and to link these massacres to
previous massacres since 1959. We failed to
understand that the killing was something totally
new, that this was not a continuity of what
happened before.2
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Far too often, correspondents assigned to cover an event or issue
involving Africa have not received the training necessary to “cover
issues, activities, and crises in developing countries.”3
The media's mischaracterization and erroneous reporting
about the Rwandan genocide is apparent in examples from
American, Canadian, and European periodicals, and from other
sources that covered the incident while it was occurring. Many of
the misguided reports were due to a lack of historical knowledge
about Rwanda. Thus, the first section of this paper examines the
historical foundation for the social divide between the Hutu and
Tutsi in Rwanda, the two groups involved in the genocide. The
paper then examines the events leading up to the genocide. The
third section focuses on the genocide itself and what I term the
Rwandan "hate media." In the last section of the paper, I highlight
the misrepresentations of the crisis by Western media and their
political ramifications.
Historical Background
Rwanda’s population consists of three main groups: the Hutu
(85%), the Tutsi (14%), and the Twa (1%).4 These three groups
share the same religion, speak the same language, and, prior to
colonization, lived peacefully with one another in the same
community. In many cases they intermarried. Each group
considered itself as belonging to a single, integrated society,
despite various social differences. The shared community among
the three groups was not unlike the shared communities of the
West, where, for example, Catholics and Jews live and work
together in the same city or suburb.
Pre-colonial Rwandese society was organized around the
mwami, or king as the central figure of authority. The mwami was
considered to be powerful, sacred, and divine. Rituals were carried
out in his honor and a special vocabulary known as "king’s
3
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speech" was used to describe his daily activities. Gerard Prunier,
author of The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide notes that:
The king was the father and the patriarch of his
people, given to them by Imana (God). He is the
providence of Rwanda, the Messiah and the savior.
When he exercises his authority, he is impeccable,
infallible. His decisions cannot be questioned. The
parents of a victim he has injustly struck bring him
presents so that he does not resent them for having
been forced to cause them affliction. They still trust
him, because his judgments are always just.
Whatever happens, he remains Nyagasami, the only
Lord, superb and magnificent.5
There were three types of chiefs who were under the king: the
mutwale wa buttaka (chief of landholdings), who was responsible
for agricultural production, land attribution, and taxation; the
mutwale wa ingabo (chief of men), in charge of recruiting men for
the king’s armies; and the mutwale wa inka (chief of pastures),
who ruled over the grazing lands.6 The mutwale wa buttaka was
normally Hutu as agriculture was their expertise, while most of the
other chiefs were Tutsi. The chiefs were responsible for minding
the cattle, working the land, and maintaining their quarters. They
also set the form of payment for each household under their
jurisdiction, which allowed people to make their own arrangements
to fulfill their government demands. This system became known
as ubuhake and remained in existence until the European powers
changed the taxation system.7
Rwanda remained free from European colonization until
May 4, 1894, when the first European, German Count Gustav
Adolf von Goetzen, was received at court by King Rwabugiri. The
King welcomed the Count, but was unaware that the European
powers had already divided up the African continent at the Berlin
Conference of 1885. The decision to give Rwanda to Germany was
5
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an act of ignorance: Germans knew nothing about Rwanda. The
Rwandan monarchy continued to exist while Germany deployed
twenty-four military officers and six administrators to Rwanda.
According to Linda Melvern, a British journalist and published
author, “The German policy was to support the chiefs in such a
manner that they would be convinced that their own salvation and
that of their supporters depended on their faithfulness to the
German.” 8 The Germans also supported expansion and helped the
Tutsi monarchy subjugate the northern areas.
After World War I, control over Rwanda and Burundi was
transferred from Germany to Belgium under a League of Nations
mandate. This covenant “was to herald a new phase of human
evolution, to offer a framework for practical and effective cooperation between nations for their common good.”9 The covenant
stipulated that the “tutelage of the peoples in the colonies should
be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources,
their experience, or their geographical position, could best,
undertake this responsibility.”10 Rwanda and Burundi were
categorized as countries lacking in self-determination. Belgium
agreed to assume administration, as well as to promote
development, free speech, and freedom of religion.
The Germans had implemented a policy of indirect rule,
which changed to one of direct rule under the Belgians. Slowly,
the Belgians progressed in changing the societal structures that had
existed throughout Rwanda’s history. In 1922, the king was forced
to accept the assistance of Belgian representatives and one year
later Belgium made it illegal for the king to have regional chiefs.
Belgian colonialists dismantled the only structure that Rwandans
had known. In 1931, King Mwami Musinga, who opposed
colonization, was removed from power by Belgian administrators
and replaced by Mutara Rudahigwa, who later became known as
“king of the whites.” 11 His values and practices were more
“western,” and his conversion to Christianity in 1943 became part
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of the Belgian policy that made Christianity mandatory for anyone
wishing to be part of the Tutsi elite.12
The Belgian government divided Rwanda into four
chiefdoms and gave Belgian administrators the authority to control
every aspect of Rwandan society. They introduced currency and
implemented an education system available only to the sons of
chiefs. They also created an African civil service that included
only members of the Tutsi oligarchy. Despite the Tutsi being a
decidedly small fraction of the total population – dwarfed in
numbers by the Hutu—Belgium was intent on elevating the Tutsi
over the Hutu based on physical characteristics. In this way, the
Belgians were cementing their unfavorable attitudes toward the
Hutu. Under the direction of the Belgian administration, Tutsi
chiefs demanded forced labor from the Hutu in building roads.
The Belgians insisted on cruel and inhumane beatings as a method
of punishment and control. As a result, hundreds of thousands of
Hutu peasants fled to Uganda to become migrant workers and
escape the mistreatment.13
European Stereotypes and the Hamitic Myth
Europeans in Rwanda had long noted physical differences within
the Rwandan population and, beginning with the Belgians, they
began to exploit those differences to create a social divide and
implement policies based on racial discrimination. John Hanning
Speke, a well-known Nile explorer in the 1800s, linked Rwandan
“monarchic institutions” to the arrival of conquering invaders from
Ethiopia (whom he speculated to be ancestors of the Tutsi). Speke
posited that Tutsis were of a Hamitic, non-African race, and thus
“superior.”14 Other explorers, such as Sir Samuel Baker and
Gaetuno Casati, accepted this formulation.
Missionaries, such as Father van den Burgt and John
Roscoe, also believed the explorers’ theories; some, however, had
different opinions. Father Pages, for example, believed that the
Tutsis were descendants of ancient Egyptians. Father van den
12
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Burgt claims, “We can see Caucasian skulls and beautiful Greek
profiles side by side with Semitic and even Jewish features, elegant
golden-red beauties in the heart of Ruanda and Urundi.”15
Tutsi features were described as though they were
European and not of the same group as the Hutu. Prunier notes
that some Europeans thought:
The Bahima [a Tutsi clan] differ absolutely by the
beauty of their features and their light colour from
the Bantu agriculturalists of an inferior type. Tall
and well-proportioned, they have long thin noses, a
wide brow and fine lips. They say they came from
the north. Their intelligent and delicate appearance,
their love of money, their capacity to adapt to any
situation seem to indicate a semitic-origin.16
These Hamitic or Semitic characteristics were purportedly the
underlying reasons why the Tutsi emerged as the privileged group.
These stereotypes not only demonstrate that the Europeans were
ignorant of Rwandese history and populations, but that they in fact
facilitated the spread of racial animosity and hatred among the
different groups. Based on the assumption that the Tutsi were
ancient European descendants, the Belgian government decided
that they were “fit to rule.” The Hutu, by contrast, were deemed
inferior. They were described as having typical African features:
“short and thick-set with a big head, jovial expression, a wide nose
and enormous lips.”17
In 1933, the Belgian administration put together a group of
Belgian bureaucrats to conduct a census of the entire population.
The purpose was to classify every Rwandan as belonging to one of
the three groups: Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. They counted each
Rwandan, measuring height, nose length, and eye shape.18 Using
physical characteristics as a way to group people into categories
was, in fact, a flawed methodology because many Rwandans were
mixed due to intermarriage. The Belgians' solution to that issue
15
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was to classify persons who were mixed as Hutu. Hutus who were
wealthy and owned the required number of livestock were
considered Tutsi.19
The Belgians then issued to every Rwandan an
identification card that indicated the group to which the person had
been assigned. The identification card policy is a primary example
of how the Belgian government created and fostered a racially
divided population based on physical appearance, a policy that
contributed significantly to the country's progression down a path
that led to genocide.
Belgian Discriminatory Policies and Their Outcomes
The favoritism displayed by the Belgian government to the Tutsi
population was pervasive and resulted in the creation of an African
civil service limited to Tutsi elites. In 1952, the Belgians
introduced electoral procedures for advisory councils at four
different administrative levels, limiting voting privileges such that
the minority Tutsi won all the seats.20
Because of these types of discrimination and repression, a
sense of Hutu nationalism and racist ideologies began to surface in
the northern region of Rwanda. In 1957, a group of Hutu
nationalists published a manifesto that called for majority rule.
Belgian Catholic priests supported the Hutus in their mission to
gain equality and abolish discrimination within the public service,
and in 1957, the United Nations pressured Belgium to liberate the
Hutu.
On July 24, 1959, Rwanda’s Tutsi King Mutara III
Rudahigwa died while in the hospital. The Tutsi elite were under
the impression that he was killed by the Belgians and that the Hutu
were also involved.21 This rumor sparked outrage among the Tutsi
population, and on November 1, 1959, a Tutsi group called Union
National Rwandaise (UNAR) attacked a Hutu leader, Dominique
Mbonyumutwa, which placed Rwanda in violent turmoil. The
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Hutu started burning Tutsi homes and launching attacks on them.
Many Tutsi fled Rwanda as a result of the violence.
This upheaval was only the beginning of the repercussions
from European interference and the Belgians' restructuring of
Rwandan society. The Belgian government placed Rwanda under
military rule on November 11, 1959. Under international pressure,
they tried to rectify the situation by replacing some Tutsi chiefs
with Hutu and announcing to Belgian administrators that the Hutu
would now be “favored within the administration.”22 Tens of
thousands of Tutsi were forced into exile in neighboring
countries.23
Gregoire Kayibanda, founder of the extremist Hutu group
Parmehutu, wanted to end Tutsi dominance forever. He organized
rallies to overthrow the Tutsi monarchy, a goal he achieved in
September 1961. By February 1962, an estimated 135,000 Tutsi
refugees were living in exile in the Congo, Burundi, Uganda, and
Tanganyika, and one thousand people were entering Uganda each
week.24
Opposition Growth Across Borders
Tutsi men displaced in refugee camps were recruited into secret
militia groups, called Inyenzi, or cockroach, by the Hutu. On
November 14, 1963, the Belgian National Guard stopped an
Inyenzi attempt to enter Rwanda to kill Hutu.25 On December 21,
1963, two hundred armed Tutsi men left Burundi and succeeded in
crossing over into Rwanda, heading toward the capital Kigali.
They were defeated and Kayibanda reacted to the Tutsi infiltration
with an organized campaign to kill Tutsi.
These killings in 1963 left journalists puzzled as to why an
event like this would happen. Lord Bertrand Russell, a Welsh
historian and philosopher, spoke of the event on Vatican Radio,
claiming that, “It was the most horrible and systematic
extermination of a people since the Nazi’s extermination of the
22
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Jews.26 These massacres organized by Kayibanda were propelled
by Kigali Radio, which aired warnings that the Tutsi were coming
back to “enslave” the Hutu, proclaimed that, “The Tutsi must be
killed before they killed the Hutu.” 27 Hoes, machetes, clubs, and
any other tools attackers could access were used to kill at least five
thousand men, women, and children. Some one hundred Tutsi
women and children committed suicide by drowning themselves in
the river to escape Hutu mobs at the Congo border.
Some consider this specific event genocide, though
Europeans working for aid agencies in Rwanda during this time
described the killings as “savagery of the negro.”28 Unfortunately,
this was not the last time that massive killings would take place; a
far worse massacre – the most horrible mass destruction of human
beings since the Jewish Holocaust of World War II – would occur
thirty years later.
Various groups of Tutsi refugees prepared to return to their
homeland in order to oppose Hutu nationalism. One group was the
Rwanda Refugees Welfare Association, later known as the
Rwandan Alliance for National Unity.29 This group operated in
exile in Kenya from 1981 to 1986. In 1987, the group changed its
name to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF consisted of
a 26-member executive committee that included 11 Tutsi and 15
Hutu who opposed then-President Habyarimana and wanted to end
his regime. A guerilla army known as the Rwandan Patriotic
Army eventually grew from this organization. They were welltrained, disciplined and had considerable combat experience.30
Civil War 1990-1993
On October 1, 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Army forces attacked
guards posted at the Rwandese border. This surprise attack was
the start of a civil war. Former Major Paul Kagame, who is the
current president of Rwanda, called this “the beginning of a
26
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protracted popular war.”31 The goal was to put an end to the
Habyarimana regime, return the Tutsi to their home country, and
take control of the government. Kagame worked with
Habyarimana’s former accomplice, Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe,
who was a Hutu living in exile. After three years of fighting, the
civil war ended with the signing of the Arusha Accords in August
1993.
The civil war gained international attention. President
Habyarimana, a Hutu extremist, had come under scrutiny for the
instability and violence that his rule generated throughout the
region. It took thirteen months of talks to get the Rwandan
government and the RPF to agree to sign the accords, the only
hope for an end to the civil war.32 The negotiations were overseen
by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), under the leadership
of Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Five African states
were involved in the negotiations (Burundi, Zaire, Senegal,
Uganda and Tanzania), along with four western countries: (France,
Belgium, Germany, and the United States), which had observer
status. Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and the European
Union monitored the talks from their local embassies.33
Under the peace agreement, Rwandan presidential power
was “reduced to no more than representing the Republic: the
President could promulgate laws but had no authority to modify or
veto them.” Not only did he have no power to nominate civil
servants, but he also could not suggest names for nominations.
Any messages addressed to the nation had to be approved by the
Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG).34
President Habyarimana agreed to sign this accord only to
maintain a good image in the eyes of foreign donors.35 He
scrambled to get support from other African leaders to buy time
and hold up democratization. He traveled to Uganda to meet with
President Museveni on August 31, 1993. The meeting turned out
to be unfavorable for President Habyarimana and left him
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searching for outside supporters to delay the implementation of the
Accords.36
Despite Habyarimana’s signing of the Arusha Accords in
August 1993, he failed to implement the agreement; too much was
at stake. The Hutu supremacists who had supported him realized
that he was incapable of defending their interests. The Hutu
extremist group Coalition Pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR)
decided to withdraw their support for Habyarimana and search for
more radical representation and appease foreign governments who
supported Habyarimana financially. Despite criticism from Europe
and other African states, and despite the eagerness of the RPF to
integrate the forces and implement the accords, Habyarimana
refused.
On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana flew to Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania and met with Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi,
Vice-President George Saitoti of Kenya, President Cyprien
Ntaryamira of Burundi, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.
The focus of the discussion was supposed to be on Burundi;
Habyarimana’s refusal, however, to abide by the Arusha Accords
was the topic of discussion. Back home, on the other hand, Hutu
extremists felt betrayed by Habyarimana’s signing of the Accords.
Thus, whether or not he implemented the agreement, he was still in
a difficult situation that he could not ignore.
President Ntaryamira accompanied President Habyarimana
in his aircraft on the way back to Kigali. At around 8:30 in the
evening on April 6, the aircraft was struck by two missiles.
Ironically, it crashed into the garden of Habyarimana’s home and
caught fire, killing everyone on board. This incident sparked the
beginning of the wave of killings that became widely
acknowledged as the Rwandan Genocide.
The Genocide of 1994: Rwandan Radio Hate Media
The Hutu-controlled Radio-Television Libres des Milles Collines
(RTLMC) was financed by Hutu extremists, which also included
Habyarimana. The purpose for this radio station had always been
36
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to incite the Rwandan Hutu majority to genocide.37 The radio
station started calling for the extermination of Tutsi as early as
January 1994 in response to the Arusha Accords. After
Habyarimana’s death, the radio station announcers had a new
rallying cry; they called for murder “to avenge the death of their
president.” On May 5, they declared that the country must be
“cleansed” of Tutsis.38
In order to achieve their goal, they helped recruit and
organize the Interhamwe militias, whose purpose was to annihilate
all Tutsi in Rwanda. Radio announcers read the names and
addresses of Tutsi and moderate Hutu who were to be killed. Their
last-known locations were also broadcast, and listeners were told,
“You have missed some of the enemies [in this or that place].
Some are still alive. You must go back and finish them off.”39
The results proved to be one of the worst human disasters ever.
Fergal Keane, a journalist and writer, asks his readers:
Remember the figures, never ever forget them, in
one hundred days up to one million people were
hacked, shot, strangled, clubbed, and burned to
death. Remember, carve this into your
consciousness: one million. This estimate equates
to three hundred and thirty-three and a third
murders an hour, or five and a half killings every
minute.40
The enormity of the bloodshed should have been recognized as
genocide immediately, but, due to Rwanda’s remote geographic
location and its lack of influence in the international arena,
thousands of men, women, and children were slaughtered while
world powers turned a blind eye. An article in The Economist
explained that, “The killing in Rwanda is too terrible to ignore. It
amounts to genocide, a word that the United States will not
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officially utter since to do so would make it harder to resist taking
action.”41
The Clinton Administration opposed using the term
genocide to describe what was taking place in Rwanda at the time.
Recognizing this as genocide would require the United States to
intervene according to their adoption of the 1948 Genocide
Convention. Nevertheless, United States government officials
publicly acknowledged that “acts of genocide” may have been
committed.42 David Rawson, former US Ambassador to Rwanda
during this time, said during an interview that “As a responsible
government, you don’t just go around hollering genocide. You say
that acts of genocide may have occurred and they need to be
investigated.”43 While western powers danced around the issue,
Hutu extremists carried out their successful agenda at an
astonishing rate.
Western Media Coverage of the Genocide
The 1994 Rwandan Genocide officially started when President
Habyarimana was killed. The Hutu extremists who supported him
blamed the Tutsi for his murder and wasted no time in trying to rid
Rwanda of Tutsi. Western media reported the violence as “a
product of tribal factions.”44 The New York Times, for example,
on April 9, 1994, headlined “Terror Convulses Rwandan Capital as
Tribes Battle.” The article understated events, citing “tribal
bloodletting” as the cause for the high death toll and also for the
evacuation of foreigners from Kigali, Rwanda’s capital. The
reporter, who clearly lacked an understanding of Rwanda’s long
history of Hutu-Tutsi conflict, attributed the violence simply to the
murder of President Habyarimana. In fact, tension between Hutu
and Tutsi had been building and worsening since the post-World
War I entry of Belgium into Rwandan society and Belgium's
41
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implementation of policies that included: inscribing “ethnic”
identification on identity cards; relegating the vast majority of
Hutu to onerous forms of forced labor; and favoring Tutsi in access
to administrative posts, education, and jobs in the modern sector.45
In another article titled, “Africa Has Yet to Come to Terms
with Its Tribal Divisions,” the author stated, “Rwanda is African
tribalism in its extreme form.”46 A news article in the San
Francisco Chronicle also incorrectly referenced the genocide as a
“tribal vendetta.”47 On the same day, the New York Times also
incorrectly referred to the genocide as a tribal war.48 In point of
fact, the Hutu and Tutsi should not be referred to as different
tribes. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a tribe is
defined as “a group of persons forming a community and claiming
descent from a common ancestor.” The Hutu and Tutsi lived in the
same community, spoke the same language, and shared the same
religion.
An article featured in the Boston Globe stated, “The
Troubles in Rwanda and Burundi go back 500 years, to the time
when the tall Tutsi came in from neighboring Ethiopia to establish
dominance over the Hutu people.”49 Even though some of the
physical features of Tutsi and Hutu differed, the two groups had
been living together and co-mingling in Rwanda when the
Europeans arrived. Moreover, recall that under Belgian policy, the
Hutu could be classified as Tutsi merely as a result of their wealth.
The classification system that was created never accurately
represented the population, thus to describe the genocide as a
“tribal war or tribal conflict” is an incorrect description of what
occurred. The article below appeared in the New York Times one
month after the genocide began and exemplifies the language used
to describe this event.
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Figure 1. Michael McMahon, “Tribal Fighting Flares Again Around the
Rwandan Capital,” New York Times, late edition, 16 May 1994.

Prolonged Civil War or Genocide?
Raphael Lemkin, a Polish jurist who lost forty-nine family
members in the Holocaust, first used the word “genocide.”50 The
term has been used to describe, “the systematic targeting of
50
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national, ethnic, or religious groups.”51 The United Nations
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, to include, however, has defined the term, more
broadly:
Any of a number of acts committed with the intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group: killing members of the
group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the
group, and forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.52
It is the totality of the intended extermination that marks genocide.
The intention and attempt of the Hutu to annihilate the
entire Tutsi population is clearly an example of genocide, yet the
media often portrayed this crisis as a civil war, implying that two
opposing political viewpoints had taken up arms simply to gain
control of the government. Three months after the genocide began,
USA Today headlined “Rwandan Rebels Call for Civil War CeaseFire.”53 The Gazette used the same mischaracterization in an
article entitled, “Toll From Rwanda’s Civil War Nears 3 Million,
UN Says.”54 The Washington Post published an editorial that
identified the violence as “savage civil war.”55 The labeling of
Africans as savages was started with the Europeans during the precolonial era. Although colonialism is a thing of the past, western
media continued to use these terms to describe the genocide. Mark
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Doyle, a British journalist, recalls a conversation that he had with a
BBC presenter:
There are two wars going on here. There’s a
shooting war and a genocide war. The two are
connected, but also distinct. In the shooting war,
there are two conventional armies at each other, and
in the genocide war, one of those armies – the
governments side with help from civilians – is
involved in mass killings.56
Rwanda had been involved in a civil war from 1990-1993. The
actions and goals of the Hutu extremists in 1994, however – to
exterminate all Tutsis – made the million deaths in 1994 genocide
and not merely the continuation of a civil war. Mahmood
Mamdani, professor of anthropology and international affairs at
Columbia University, wrote:
But whereas these Hutu were murdered as
individuals—butchered for their beliefs or their
actions—the Tutsi were murdered because they
were Tutsi. This is why the killings of more than
half a million Rwandan Tutsi between March and
July of 1994 must be called genocide.57
"War" and "genocide" are not simply two variations of the same
behavior and the media's characterization of the 1994 events in
Rwanda as "civil war" necessarily misled and misinformed
Western audiences. In the Western mind, war is an activity
involving two or more opposing sets of organized combatants or
warriors who might contest land, property, or political supremacy.
War involves accepted rules of engagement, the taking and
humane treatment of prisoners who are returned at the conclusion
of hostilities, and perhaps most importantly, the idea that civilians
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are off limits to the warriors. The loser in a war surrenders and is
not exterminated.
Genocide, on the other hand, is directed at the civilians as it
aims to exterminate rather than to imprison, to annihilate rather
than to capture. It is not land or political powers that those
engaged in genocide seek; rather, it is the total elimination of the
existence of the persons who are the objects of the genocide.
Western audiences were deceived by a "war" characterization that
distorted, and in the process minimized, what was actually
occurring in Rwanda.
The Genocide and its Representation of Africa
Africa is often depicted to Westerners as a place of destruction,
death, and deprivation. Westerners should not be led to believe
such characteristics represent the entire continent. Nonetheless,
some journalists reported the genocide as if it took place in all of
Africa rather than in one specific country. The Salt Lake Tribune
published an article titled, “Map of Africa Shifts As More Wars
Break Out African Map Runs Red; Wars Erupt Among
Incompatibles.”58 The same newspaper also issued another article
one day later headlined, “Foreigners Flee As Blood Flows in
Rwanda Stench of Death Everywhere As Rebels Advance; U.S.
Sends Troops to Burundi Americans Flee For Their Lives From
Africa’s Land of Death.” 59 These headlines give the impression
that the entire African continent was affected by the genocide and
not just the country where it was taking place. The cartoon image
below was featured in the Christian Science Monitor when the
Rwandan Genocide first started. Garth Myers, Thomas Klak and
Timothy Koehl argue that this image highlights the exaggerated
misconceptions that all of Africa is experiencing the same crises.60
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A mother and her child are seen emerging from the continent
without any specific geographic context as to where the genocide
was actually occurring. These types of depictions send a clear
message about the way Western media views Africa, especially in
a time of crisis.

Figure 2: Image reprinted from Christian Science Monitor61

Conclusion
The Rwandan Genocide represents both an international and media
failure. As acts of genocide were perpetrated, Western powers
ignored what was happening and the Western media continued to
report the situation inaccurately and without any context. The role
of Belgian colonialism had created divisions within Rwandan
society that segregated persons who were not members of separate
tribes, but people who had lived and worked together for centuries
before the Europeans arrived.
The media, however, overlooked and over-simplified the
origins of the genocide, and in so doing, misled Western
audiences. California State University Fullerton professor Ronald
Pahl states, “What is neglected or ignored in the reporting on
61
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Africa are the issues that have caused these problems for the
African nations.”62 As long as Western media continue to portray
the continent in this manner, the rest of the world will never be
able to understand accurately the underlying reality of Africa and
its issues.
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Project Operation Whitecoat:
Military Experimentation, Seventh-Day Adventism
and Conscientious Cooperation
BY ALICIA GUTIERREZ
From 1954-1973, the U.S. Army established an
unlikely alliance with the Seventh-Day Adventist (SDA) Church
and their unequivocal support for a series of biomedical
experiments called Project Operation Whitecoat (POW). In a letter
dated October 19, 1954, Dr. T. R. Flaiz, Secretary of the Medical
Department of the General Conference of SDAs wrote to thenSurgeon General Major George E. Armstrong, “the medical
research project which you have under way… offers an excellent
opportunity for these young men to render a service which will be
of value not only to military medicine but to public health
generally.”1 While the notion of church, military and government
cooperation, especially in regards to human experimentation may
seem incongruous, unorthodox and paradoxical, the nature of the
relationship that the church was able to maintain with the military
hierarchy allowed for a series of biological experiments that can
be considered a model of ethical human experimentation.
ABSTRACT:

According to testimony by the United States General Accounting
Office to the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee,
Committee on Government Operations in the House of
Representatives, a shroud of secrecy surrounds government
sponsored experiments conducted on humans between 1940 and
1974.2 Since the Nuremberg trials, which condemned the acts of
Nazi doctors, US agencies adopted the Nuremberg Code. The
Nuremberg Code requires that researchers obtain informed consent
1
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before conducting any research involving human subjects.
Researchers are also required to allow their human subjects the
freedom to discontinue participation in any study in which they are
involved as human subjects. Despite these codes designed to
protect the rights of human subjects in research, in terms of
government and/or military medical experimentation after World
War II, no overarching or overseeing agency existed to ensure that
these experiments were being executed in accordance with federal
laws or policies, such as the Nuremberg Codes.3 Between 1954 and
1973, a series of ethical experimentation was conducted in the
United States that stood in sharp contrast to regulations that might
have better protected the humans involved in the research.
Project Operation Whitecoat (POW), as it was called, was a
code name for an alliance between the US Army and the SeventhDay Adventist (SDA) Church to provide an alternative means by
which Seventh-Day Adventists could serve their county militarily.
This alternative means of service meant that Seventh-Day
Adventists would become the subjects of military medical
research. In a letter dated October 19, 1954, Dr. T. R. Flaiz,
Secretary of the Medical Department of the General Conference of
SDAs wrote to then-Surgeon General Major George E. Armstrong,
“the medical research project which you have under way… offers
an excellent opportunity for these young men to render a service
which will be of value not only to military medicine but to public
health generally.”4 Attached to this letter was a preliminary
statement by the General Conference regarding the use of
volunteers for medical research. It stated, “it is the attitude of
Seventh-Day Adventists that any service rendered voluntarily by
whomsoever in the useful necessary research into the cause and
treatment of disabling disease is a legitimate and laudable
contribution to the success of our nation and to the health and
comfort of our fellow man.”5 POW gave Seventh-Day Adventists
a way to serve the country in a meaningful way that did not
involve fighting in a war directly.
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Surprisingly little, if any, research has been done on POW.
Because of the direct involvement of the SDA church and the strict
supervision of the Army surgeon general, POW was able to
distinguish itself away from the shroud of secrecy surrounding
other military experiments and serve as a model for conscious,
ethical human experimentation in an era when deception ran
rampant.
The Seventh-Day Adventist Church in America: A Brief Military
History
Throughout its history, the SDA church has been actively engaged
and concerned with the involvement of its members in the military.
In order to better grasp the role that the SDA church was able to
play in POW, it is important to look at its history through the lens
of military relations. The SDA church emerged from the Christian
Connection and later, the Millerite Movement. The Christian
Connection was “a religious body that in the mid-nineteenth
century was fifth in membership within the United States.”6 One of
the founding beliefs in this movement was literal interpretation,
and sole authority, of the Bible. This included observance of the
seventh-day (Saturday) as the Sabbath and the belief in the “literal
soon advent of Christ.”7
Baptist preacher William Miller was renowned for the
knowledge that he displayed when interpreting the Bible. He
believed that Christ’s second coming was fast approaching which
prompted believers and scores of churches to adopt the name
‘Adventist’ for themselves by the 1830s and 1840s.8 Some
Adventists followed Miller’s belief that based on his calculations
the Second Advent would occur in 1844. There were others,
however, who believed that Christ’s advent could not be
determined, and was yet to arrive, causing a theological schism. In
1844, a small wood structure in Washington, New Hampshire
became the first ‘Adventist’ church, and on May 21, 1863, “the

6
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denomination was officially organized… [and] included some 125
churches and 3,500 members.”9
The early SDA church placed an important emphasis on
freedom. As the church itself points out, because of this, SDAs
“worked toward abolition of slavery as well as roles for women in
the church… Freedom was also emphasized through an orientation
toward temperance and health reform… Thus within nineteenthcentury Adventism one finds strong anti-slavery actions, women
licensed as ministers, and health reform principles that included
abolition of alcohol and tobacco.”10 This movement towards
freedom, especially anti-slavery sentiment, caused SDAs to side
with the North during the Civil War. According to a statement
released by renowned Adventist prophetess Ellen G. White in
1863, “God gives him [the slaveholder] no title to human souls,
and he has no right to hold them as his property... God has made
man a free moral agent, whether white or black. The institution of
slavery does away with this and permits man to exercise over his
fellow man a power, which God has never granted him.”11 Yet,
literal interpretation of the Bible, including the Sixth
Commandment that forbids killing, put them at odds with the
military. Because of the Civil War, the SDA church was forced to
deal with this ideological dilemma just as the church was being
formed.12 In 1863, the Union implemented conscription and the
SDA church took an official stance against military service. This
clearly resonates from White’s prophecy:
God’s people… cannot engage in this perplexing
war, for it is opposed to every principle of their
faith. In the army they cannot obey the truth and at
the same time obey the requirements of their
officers… Those who love God’s commandments
will conform to every good law of the land. But if
the requirements of the rulers are such as conflict
9
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with the laws of God, the only question to be settled
is:
Shall we obey God, or man?13
The SDA position on war made them a minority, which resulted in
some disdain and contempt, yet they were not faced with legal
penalization. When a member of the SDA church was drafted, the
congregation utilized a provision allowing them to pay their way
out of military service. Thus, drafted men were able to avoid
military service by paying a $300 commutation fee. When a poor
member of the congregation was drafted, the church worked
together to raise money, thereby cementing a legacy of the SDA
church involving itself in individual members’ military affairs. In
1864, the military created a stipulation allowing people or religious
organizations to file for noncombatant status; however, the
Adventist church did not immediately seek to gain recognition
under it because they felt secure, confident and protected by the
general accessibility of the commutations fee. When the
commutation fee became subject to restricted use in July of 1864,
the SDA church sought to gain recognition as noncombatants and
ultimately received it from the state and federal levels of
government.
Along with the end of the Civil War went any further
discussion of SDA military service. Although SDAs admonished
the Spanish-American War of 1898 and encouraged pacifism, the
lack of conscription did not necessitate any further action. But
when World War I erupted and conscription once again became an
issue that members had to face directly, the SDA church developed
a new viewpoint on what it meant to be a noncombatant.
When the draft was implemented for World War I, the
SDA church took a major step in their stance on military service.
Avoiding the myth that church doctrine was fait accompli, the
SDA church changed their definition of noncombatant service.
According to sociologist Ronald Lawson, “instead of being
pacifists who refused to be involved in war, Adventists would now
respond to the draft but refrain from bearing arms. As unarmed
soldiers, they would not kill but do good.”14 This conversion did
13
14
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not come without debate. A week after the U.S. declared war,
Adventist leaders met and petitioned that Adventists “be required
to serve our country only in such capacity as will not violate our
conscientious obedience to the law of God.”15 Dr. Lawson
believes that this change was an attempt by the church to move
away from ‘sect’ towards ‘denomination.’ According to Lawson,
who utilizes Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge’s churchsect theory:
A highly sectarian group has high tension with
society, a mainline denomination low tension, with
a continuum between the two representing varying
degrees of tension. As a group moves from sect
towards denomination, this is indicated by
relaxation in tension… When a religious group
concludes that military service contravenes its
principles and rejects the call to arms, that decision
marks it as different. Depending on the political
context, it may elicit antagonistic responses—scorn
and harassment from the public and punishment by
the state. This indicates that the group’s tension
with society is high— that it is towards the sect end
of the church-sect scale. Since many sects, over
time, reduce their tension with society and move
towards the church end of the scale, a sect holding a
deviant position on conscription is likely to modify
its stand in order to reduce tension.16
In other words, religious denomination and sect sit at opposite ends
of a sliding scale. ‘Sect’ or ‘denomination’ is determined by a
group’s tension with society. If a group’s religious doctrines or
practices place them in a position where they are at odds with
mainline society, they are considered a sect. Consequently, the
more a religious group’s doctrines and practices fit within mainline
society, the more they are considered a denomination. If a group
15
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does not want to retain the stigma associated with being considered
a ‘sect,’ then the best way to do this would be to reduce the
“tension” with society by adjusting their beliefs and practices to fit
mainline society.
The shift from non-militarized pacifists, who paid
commutation fees to avoid the draft, to militarized noncombatants,
who allowed themselves to be drafted, yet, classified differently
not to bear arms, did not seem to challenge SDA and biblical
doctrine. SDAs did not see a problem with aiding the sick. They
believed that whatever a wounded soldier decided to do after being
rehabilitated was not their responsibility. They were proud,
patriotic and willing to offer any assistance to their country so long
as it was harmonious with their religious conviction. Further, this
would create a legacy that combined patriotism with pacifism in a
way that was religiously based.17
Based on biblical principles, SDAs long believed that it
was important to give to God what is God’s and give to Caesar
what is Caesar’s.18 In other words, while SDAs believed that their
primary duty was to serve God, this adherence to God’s law and
the bible should not get in the way of their duties and
responsibilities here on earth (granted they do not conflict with
biblical principles). SDAs believed that it was imperative to follow
civil authority because it maintained order. Further, by being good
citizens and not stirring up agitation or confrontation, SDAs would
not be harassed for avoiding their duty to the country in a time of
war, and might even be regarded highly for doing their service.19
Good citizenship would allow the SDA to remain in good favor
with the government and allow the individual to continue to enjoy
the comfort and protection the government provides him (or her).
In order to prepare SDA men for noncombatant service, the
North American Division of the SDA church established training
schools at its colleges and academies in conjunction with the Red
Cross. This allowed young men who were predisposed to the draft
17
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to acquire basic medical training so that they would be attractive
candidates for noncombatant medical units within the military.
This also worked well with the church because providing medical
aid would not conflict with allowable activity for the Sabbath.20
With the implementation of the draft, the SDA church took
steps to resolve potential conflicts between the service that their
noncombatant members would be asked to perform and other core
religious beliefs. The SDA church created the National Service
Organization (NSO), an organization that deals with conflicts that
arise in the armed forces between noncombatancy and Sabbath
observance.21 The creation of the NSO made it outwardly clear that
the SDA church would be readily available and vigilant in the
handling of its members within the armed forces.
In the wake of rising tensions in Europe prior to the start of
the second World War, the General Conference of SDAs released a
pamphlet in 1934 that, “urged youth to prepare for noncombatant
service by graduating in medicine, nursing, dietetics, or some other
medically related field, or to at least get experience as cooks,
nurses’ aides, etc.”22 The SDA church also implemented another
program, similar to their Red Cross training in WWI, but it was
revised and refined into a collaborative effort with the military and
army leaders who were used to supervise the program.23 Once the
war began, the program expanded among the SDA educational and
religious system. However, some SDAs disfavored the
involvement and relations between the government and SDA
church and accused it of being a “part of the national war
machine.”24 Referred to as ‘reformers,’ the SDA Reform
Movement began to diverge from mainline SDAs after WWI. The
movement began in Europe and expanded to the United States.
SDA Reformers believed that when the General Conference
adjusted their position of noncombatancy in the beginning of the
First World War, “the leadership… overthrew the commandments
of God… Hence, they have the right to exist as a separate
20
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movement… Reform Adventists believe that no true believer could
ever join the military, even in medical work.”25 For the most part,
however, SDA reformers were the minority, and mainline SDAs
supported noncombatant roles in military service.
With the passage of the Selective Service Act in September
1940, the SDA once again had to clarify its stand on SDA military
service versus other classifications such as conscientious objectors
or noncombatant military service:
Those refusing to bear arms were classified as
‘conscientious objectors’… During World War II,
American Adventists enthusiastically embraced the
national consensus about the rightness of defending
freedom against aggression of ultra-nationalist
dictatorships. Noncombatant military service…
offered a way to prove their patriotism. Moreover,
their distinguished service demonstrated that
noncombatancy was not cowardice. Desmond T.
Doss, with his bravery in winning the Congressional
Medal of Honor in 1945—the first ever awarded to
a noncombatant—provided compelling evidence for
that point.26
However, there was still lingering uncertainty as to whether or not
SDAs should bear arms. In Atlantic Union Gleaner, an SDA
newsletter for the Atlantic region, dated December 24, 1941, two
weeks after the attack at Pearl Harbor, an article entitled “Should
Our Men Drill with Rifles?” relayed this fear. This article stated
that “considerable… agitation has been stirred up among our
people regarding the question as to whether our young men in
army camps should consent to drill with rifles when pressure from
army officers is brought upon them…”27 In order to alleviate some
of the tension felt by men in the military, or planning to enter the
25
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military, Atlantic Union Gleaner provided, in text, the Definition
of Noncombatant Training and Service as signed in Executive
Order on December 6, 1940. It also stated that the SDA
headquarters was “taking steps… to relieve this pressure at these…
camps by bringing to the attention of their post commanders the
official documents which have a bearing upon this particular
matter.”28 The article also listed the various different task groups
and assignments that were suitable for 1-A-O29 level COs.
Because of their dedication to serving both God and
country, many SDAs in military service refused the label of
‘conscientious objectors,’ and preferred, instead, the label of
conscientious cooperators. With this more cooperative position,
SDAs were more welcomed and received by the military hierarchy
than other religious groups.30 According to Lawson, “some 12,000
American Adventists served during World War II as
noncombatants in medical branches of the services, where they
could observe the Sabbath conscientiously, with official
government recognition.”31
When the Korean and Vietnam Wars commenced, the SDA
church revived their Medical Cadet Training Program as they
previously had operating during WWII. In Atlantic Union Gleaner,
an article on July 17, 1951 explains training at Camp Desmond T.
Doss. At the close of their training, one man stated “‘I do not fear
to enter the army service…I want to be faithful in my service to
my God and my country.’”32 In addition to the revamped training,
the Korean War also saw the first appointments of SDAs into
positions of military chaplaincy. This was clearly another step with
SDA/military relations. This is where the POW story begins.

28

Haynes, 3.
A status of 1-A-O signifies that the individual will participate in military
activity and will cooperate with military sanctions, but will only assume a
noncombatant role.
30
Lawson, "Church and State" 291.
31
Lawson, "Church and State" 291.
32
A.M. Ragsdale, “Camp Desmond T. Doss,” Atlantic Union Gleaner, July 17,
1951.
29

68

Alicia Gutierrez

Human Medical Experimentation: An Overview
Human experimentation has been in existence since the early
development of science, and it is beyond the scope of the paper to
deal with its extensive history. Nonetheless, it is useful to have a
brief understanding of the history of medical experimentation in
order to understand why POW was so different. The Ancient
Greeks and Romans engaged in occasional vivisection for
exploratory knowledge in medicine. Many experiments in early
civilizations were done on condemned criminals because their
suffering and death was seen as restitution for their crimes and as a
token for the greater good of society. In the Middle Ages, animals,
cadavers, and the occasional living human were used to learn about
the human body.33
During the Renaissance, an example of experimentation on
humans can be found in Fallopius, a physician who acquired
permission to perform experiments on criminals from the duke of
Tuscany. Throughout the Scientific Revolution, Paracelsus,
Andreas Vesalius and William Harvey began applying data
gleaned from the dissections of animals onto the study of humans.
This resulted in applications of the scientific method, and more
dangerous experiments being performed on humans.34
During the 19th and 20th centuries, human experimentation
increased along with newfound medical theories. Most of the time:
Research was done with treatments or cures in
mind; in others, treatments were denied or studies
ignored either because the disease in question was
limited to black populations or poor immigrant
groups, or so that researchers could follow the
progression of an untreated disease from beginning
to fatal end. The purpose in both instances was
simply to add to the body of knowledge, regardless

33
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of the consequences, or to answer questions
addressed by basic research.35
Because of this goal-oriented research, many basic human rights
were violated. For example, Adil Shamoo and David Resnik relate
how:
In 1895, Henry Heiman, a New York pediatrician,
infected two mentally retarded boys, 4 and 16 years
old, with gonorrhea. In 1897, the Italian researcher
Giuseppe Sanerilii injected yellow fever bacteria
into five subjects without their consent in order to
test its virulence… [and] the discoverer of the
bacillus strain that causes leprosy, Amauer Hansen,
carried out an appalling experiment on an unwitting
33-year-old woman when he twice pricked her eye
with a needle contaminated by nodules of a leprous
patient.36
Germ theory made experiments of the latter kind more common. In
1892, Albert Neisser, a professor of dermatology at the University
of Breslau, wanted to study the possibility of vaccinating healthy
children from the syphilis virus. To do so, he took samples from
syphilitics and inoculated three teenage prostitutes and four healthy
children without acquiring consent from them, their parents or
guardians. 37
The notion of consent in early medical experimentation was
novel and/or occasional at best. Because of social constructions,
racial theories and social Darwinism, certain people were not seen
as being as valuable as others, thereby resulting in scientists
performing some experiments without informed consent. This
meant that the people most often at risk were those belonging to
“vulnerable populations: children, mentally ill people, poor people,
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prisoners, minorities, and hopelessly ill people.”38 Vulnerable
populations are people whose capacity to provide consent is
inhibited or questionable. Also considered vulnerable populations
are: embryos, fetuses, and people who are coerced or pressured
into participating. Early to early-modern scientists and physicians
were in a situation where human ethical concerns were either
nonexistent, or juxtaposed to their desire and commitment to
critical advances in medicine, science and anatomy.
In Cuba between 1900 and 1901, Major Walter Reed and
his acting assistant surgeons wrestled with yellow fever. When
Jesse Lazear received orders from the Army Medical Corps, he
acquainted himself with Walter Reed and the two joined forces to
create a research team to study yellow fever where it originated.39
Their goal was to study the cause of yellow fever. Previous
research had led them to assume it was either mosquitoes or
fomites. The research team in Havana’s “aim was confirmation of
the mosquito theory and invalidation of the long-held belief in
fomites.”40 While they were able to prove their theories, another
important aspect that emerged from this experiment was the notion
of informed consent. Written in both English and Spanish, and
done “with the advice of the Commission and others, he [Reed]
drafted what is now one of the oldest series of extant informed
consent documents.”41 The informed consent forms required the
men to be over the age of 25, and allowed them the opportunity to
exercise their free will. They signed that they were volunteering to
participate in the experiment “and as a reward for participation
would receive $100 ‘in American gold,’ with an additional
hundred-dollar supplement for contracting yellow fever. These
payments could be assigned to a survivor, and the volunteer agreed
to forfeit any remuneration in cases of desertion.”42
While Reed and his team made efforts in the early 20th
century towards an ethical model for human experimentation,
38
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some of the clearest and most recent examples of unethical human
research can be seen in Nazi and Japanese experimentation during
WWII. In the concentration camps, the prisoners were at the mercy
of their captors. Nazi medical doctors within the concentration
camps had an unfathomable degree of freedom in performing
experiments. Humans were treated like guinea pigs and subjected
to the experiments of their physicians’ choice which usually fell
into at least one of three categories: experiments for military
research purposes, experiments to prove racial superiority, or
experiments based on the interest of a particular scientist or
researcher. Among these (but not limited to these) were typhus
experiments, malaria experiments, high altitude experiments,
hypothermia experiments, seawater experiments (to determine
possibilities for making seawater potable), polygal (blood
coagulation) experiments, mustard gas experiments, and
sterilization experiments.
In China during WWII, the Japanese implemented their
very own system of medical and biomedical experimentation on
subjugated people and prisoners-of-war. Unit 731 was “the world’s
largest and most comprehensive biological warfare programme
[sic].”43 It was responsible for dropping “plague-infected fleas…
over Chinese cities, causing epidemics, [and pouring] cholera and
typhoid cultures… into wells. Prisoners were dissected alive
without anesthetics. Others were subjected to pressure changes that
made their bodies literally explode.”44 While there is evidence of a
American and Japanese cover-up, it is estimated that “more than
10,000 Chinese, Korean and Russian POWs were slaughtered in
these experimental facilities.”45 Even as some Nazi doctors were
condemned at the Nuremberg trials, all the Japanese doctors who
had been posted to Unit 731 “returned as pillars of the postwar
medical establishment, as deans of medical schools and heads of
pharmaceutical companies… [When asked about Unit 731 later,
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they] complained of wasting the best years of their lives on
medical research that could not be continued after the war.”46
The lasting legacy of WWII and human medical
experimentation was the Nuremberg code. During the Nuremberg
Trials, one trial was devoted entirely to medicine. Sometimes
called the Doctors’ Trial, U.S.A. v. Karl Brandt et al transpired
between 1946 and 1947. During the trial, “twenty-three doctors
and administrators [were] accused of organizing and participating
in war crimes and crimes against humanity in the form of medical
experiments and medical procedures inflicted on prisoners and
civilians.”47 The doctors were “indicted on four counts: 1.
conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity; 2.
war crimes (i.e., crimes against persons protected by the laws of
war, such as prisoners of war); 3. crimes against humanity
(including persons not protected by the laws of war); and 4.
membership in a criminal organization (the SS).”48 The exact
crimes they were charged with included “twelve series of medical
experiments concerning the effects of and treatments for high
altitude conditions, freezing, malaria, poison gas, sulfanilamide,
bone, muscle, and nerve regeneration, bone transplantation,
saltwater consumption, epidemic jaundice, sterilization, typhus,
poisons, and incendiary bombs.”49 The experiments were
performed on concentration camp inmates and did not involve any
kind of informed consent. While in some cases, patients found
ways to be medical test subjects for the ‘perks’ it invoked (i.e. less
crowded living conditions, more food, not having to work), they
were subject to the will of the camp doctor and could be sent off
for experimentation as easily as they could be sent off for
dissection or the gas chambers.
Karl Brandt was the primary defendant because of his
position as the “senior medical official of the German government
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during World War II; other defendants included senior doctors and
administrators in the armed forces and SS.”50 The results of the
trials were staggering. Brandt and six others were sentenced to
death and executed, nine others were given lengthy prison terms,
while the rest were acquitted. Besides the executions and prison
terms, the Nuremberg code was established for appropriate codes
of conduct for ethical research using human beings.
Following WWII, human medical experimentation was
forced to revise itself according to the horrors that had been seen
via Nazi and Japanese medical experimentation. However,
research purposes shifted from germ theory to creating new
biochemical weaponry. Much of this shift in the United States can
be attributed to the newfound information acquired from giving
impunity to certain perpetrators of WWII, particularly Unit 731, in
exchange for research and data.
Despite the Nuremberg code, ethical abuses persisted for
quite some time. One of the reasons for this may be that “many
researchers here [in the U.S.] thought the Nuremberg Code applied
only to ‘barbarians’ and not to ‘civilized physician investigators’…
so human-subject research was not as strongly influenced by the
principles of the Nuremberg Code as it ought to have been.”51 A
striking example of this is the Tuskegee syphilis experiment.
Though it began in the 1930s, it continued well into the 1970s.
This study, which occurred in public health facilities in Tuskegee,
Alabama, was designed to study effects of later-stage syphilis on
African-American men.52 Funded by the U.S. Department of
health, six hundred men participated in this study. Those who
participated were not informed that they had syphilis or that they
were partaking in a medical experiment. Infected participants were
merely told “that they had ‘bad blood’ and could receive medical
treatment for their condition, which consisted of nothing more than
medical examinations. Subjects also received free hot lunches and
free burials.”53 Though a dependable treatment for syphilis was
50
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available in the 1940s, it was not administered to the test subjects
and the experiment continued despite the ethical concerns that this
raises.
In the 1950s, thalidomide, an approved drug in Europe, was
given to pregnant women because physicians believed it to help
with nausea and sleep deprivation. Unfortunately, it was soon
learned that exposure to thalidomide during the first trimester of
pregnancy could cause severe deformities in the fetus. Most the
women did not know that thalidomide was still an experimental
drug and did not give informed consent. Thalidomide caused many
of the babies to have shortened and/or missing limbs. It is
estimated that “some 12,000 babies were born with severe
deformities due to thalidomide.”54
From 1956-1980, “a team of infectious disease experts
from New York University working under a distinguished
researcher, Dr. Saul Krugman, had been doing hepatitis research at
the Willowbrook School on Staten Island, New York.”55
Willowbrook was a state-run facility for mentally handicapped
adolescents and children. In “trying to find a way to protect people
from hepatitis, Krugman and his colleagues deliberately infected
some of the children with the virus.”56 Though hepatitis isn’t
generally life threatening, it can cause permanent damage to the
liver. The conditions at Willowbrook made headlines in the 1960s;
“viral hepatitis was endemic… most children who entered
Willowbrook became infected within 6-12 months of admission.”57
Though Krugman and his team did acquire informed consent from
the parents of the children, critics of the experiment felt that the
parents were coerced into acceptance because they could not care
for their special-needs children on their own and were not fully
aware of the stipulations of the study.
In 1964, The Nuremberg code would be revisited in order
to create a new model for human medical experimentation. The
“World Medical Association met in Helsinki, Finland to… add… 2
novel elements [to the basis of the Nuremberg code]: the interests
54
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of the subject should always be placed above the interest of
society; [and] every subject should get the best known
treatment.”58 The Declaration of Helsinki, however, did not put an
immediate end to the unethical human experiments that were still
transpiring, or to future unethical medical experiments. In fact,
experiments seemed to increase at an alarming rate. For example,
continuing through the 1960s was the Jewish Chronic Disease
Hospital Study in which twenty-two elderly, severely ill, and
mostly demented patients with weak immune systems were
injected with live cancer cells in order to see the effects and spread
of cancer on those with compromised immune systems.59 Between
1963 and 1973, a million-dollar Atomic Energy Commission study
used prison inmates from Oregon and Washington and had their
testicles irradiated.60 The government used “approximately 6,700
human subjects… in experiments involving psychoactive
chemicals [like LSD]… Other agents were also used, including
morphine, Demerol, Seconal, mescaline, atropine, and
psilocybin.”61 Pregnant women and mentally handicapped children
were fed radioactive iron, and cereal, respectively; all without
informed consent or an awareness of their participation in the
studies.
Though many tests were under the individual supervision
of the directing scientists or physicians, the Department of Defense
(DOD) “and other national security agencies conducted or
sponsored extensive radiological, chemical, and biological research
programs.”62 Since these were largely for military intelligence, the
scientific and military communities cooperated together for more
than thirty years to attempt to stay ahead of the United States
military rivals.63 Because of their secretive nature, the exact
number of experiments and test participants remained hidden from
public knowledge.64 The secret nature of the programs and
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experiments has also made it difficult for test subjects to acquire
deserved medical care later in life. While the government does
offer compensation for its employees (military and civilian) who
have been injured on the job, the lack of information, risks, and
centralized information has caused difficulty for those who had
experiments performed on them from 1940-1974 and are
attempting to claim poor health as a result.65 The scope of tests
conducted under military or federal direction served to “support
weapon development programs, identify methods to protect the
health of military personnel against a variety of diseases and
combat conditions, and analyze U.S. defense vulnerabilities.”66
Project Operation Whitecoat
Project Operation Whitecoat was a project to identify and protect
civilians and the military from biological and chemical agents.
Since the use of these agents in earlier wars, the desire to
investigate these weapons and their effects became a military
priority.67 Project Operation Whitecoat originated from a smaller
test called CD-22. CD-22 was a coordinated effort between the
“Chemical and Medical elements of the Army and involved the
supervision of the Secretary of the Army, Army Chief of Staff, and
the Secretary of Defense.”68 In October of 1954, Lt. Colonel W.D.
Tigertt of the U.S. Army contacted Theodore R. Flaiz, M.D.,
Secretary of the Medical Department of the General Conference of
SDAs. In a memorandum from Tigertt to Major General George E.
Armstrong, MC, the Surgeon General of the Department of the
Army, Tigertt explains the letter he wrote to Flaiz. In the memo, he
states he contacted Dr. Theodore R. Flaiz, Secretary of the Medical
Department for the General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists
as he wrote:
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To ascertain the views of his church organization as
they relate to the use of volunteers in medical
research…Dr. Flaiz proposed that it should be
considered by a small group of the Conference
Officers and agreed to bring such a group together
during the week of 18 October. Dr. Flaiz appeared
to be extremely interested and to consider that it
was a real opportunity for members of the SeventhDay Adventist group to assist in the national
defense. It is possible that the Church will actively
support the project and assist in obtaining the
necessary volunteers.69
Major General Armstrong, too, followed up with a letter to Dr.
Flaiz that expressed his hope that the General Conference of SDAs
would find the program acceptable and suitable for SDA
participation. Participation, Major General Armstrong stated,
would allow SDAs to “make yet another significant contribution to
our nation’s health and to our national security.”70
On October 19, 1954, Dr. Flaiz replied to Major General
Armstrong. In the letter, he stated that the General Conference
“appreciated very much Colonel Tigertt’s clear and patient
delineation of the plan for the medical research project… If any
one should recognise [sic] a debt of loyalty and service for the
many courtesies and considerations received from the Department
of Defense… Adventists, are in a position to feel a debt of
gratitude for these kind considerations.”71 He continued that the
General Conference felt that “the type of voluntary service which
is being offered to our boys in this research problem offers an
excellent opportunity for these young men to render a service
which will be of value not only to military medicine but to public
health generally… It should be regarded as a privilege to be
identified with this significant advanced step in clinical
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research.”72 The letter ends stating that the General Conference
would work on releasing a statement regarding the subject within a
few days. In the statement, it is expressed “it is the attitude of
Seventh-Day Adventists that any service rendered voluntarily by
whomsoever in the useful necessary research into the cause and the
treatment of disabling disease is a legitimate and laudable
contribution to the success of our nation and to the health and
comfort of our fellow men.”73
There are several reasons that might indicate why the
military sought out SDAs. One aspect, that many like to focus on,
is that SDAs were considered an ideal control group. With so many
church principles focusing on health and wellness, SDAs refrained
from drinking, smoking, most ate a vegetarian diet and most were
in general good health. According to “Colonel Dan Crozier, then
commander of USAMRIID [U.S. Army Medical Research Institute
for Infectious Diseases, previously USAMU, U.S. Army Medical
Unit]…‘because of high principles and temperate living, Adventist
men are more nearly uniform in physical fitness and mental
outlook.’”74
Another aspect is the commitment of the SDA church to
medical advancement. Over the course of its history, the SDA
church had established itself as a premiere health-serving
institution. Presently, “the SDA church organization owns and
operates a health care system that includes 168 hospitals, 433
clinics, and 130 nursing homes or retirement centers. SDA
educational institutions include 55 nursing schools… [with]
approximately 7300 nursing students currently enrolled…”75
According to a report by the National Service Organization of the
General Conference of SDAs, SDAs were recruited because the
“volunteers must be men in good health who are motivated to

72

Major General George E. Armstrong, “Draft of Letter from Major General
Armstrong to T.R. Flaiz,” n.d.
73
Statement of Attitude Regarding Volunteering For Medical Research.
74
“Seventh-day Adventists and Project Whitecoat,” The Winds,
http://www.apfn.org/thewinds/1998/11/project_whitecoat.html (accessed May
23, 2010)
75
Elizabeth Johnston Taylor and Mark F. Carr, “Nursing Ethics in the SeventhDay Adventist Religious Tradition,” Nursing Ethics 16, no. 6 (November 2009):
707.

79

Project Operation Whitecoat

hazard some risk for a humanitarian cause.”76 Further, the fact that
most of the SDA men recruited for POW had similar backgrounds,
lifestyle, education and morals allowed for favorable research
conditions on a group requiring minimal disciplinary actions.
Another possibility is the relationships that had been
formed with SDAs and the military through the years of
established cooperative noncombatancy and Red Cross training
academies. Also, it is important to note “Adventist basic trainees
at Fort Sam Houston, Texas…[were] the largest single group of 1A-O soldiers.”77
SDAs may have also decided to embark on this project
because medicine was seen as a form of evangelism. According to
Francis McLellan Wilcox, former editor for the Review and
Herald, an SDA magazine, “this work [of evangelism] has been
carried forward in four great divisions, namely, evangelistic,
publishing, educational, and medical… all of these agencies should
be used for the accomplishment of one end,—the salvation of
souls.”78 Regardless, with the approval from the General
Conference, recruitment and testing began almost immediately. In
November of 1954, Lt. Col. Tigertt recruited twelve individuals
from Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, TX. On December 30, 1954,
the twelve recruits left Fort Sam Houston to Camp Detrick near
Frederick, Maryland and on January 14, 1955, the secretary of the
Army granted the authority to permit “research investigation
utilizing volunteers in defense against biological warfare.”79 In all,
Tigertt “indicated that approximately 80% of Seventh Day
Adventists who qualify and are approached by him do volunteer
for this particular assignment.”80
CD-22 was a series Q-fever tests. Q-fever is a “zoonotic
disease… [and is transmitted to] humans usually… by
inhalation.”81 Once an individual was designated for CD-22, and
later, Project Operation Whitecoat service, they were forbidden
76
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from receiving vaccines for typhus, yellow fever, cholera and the
plague while in basic training. For CD-22, volunteers from Camp
Detrick were flown to Fort Dugway, Utah and were exposed to Qfever via wind measures. Others remained at Camp Detrick and
were exposed via aerosol measures in the notorious eight ball
sphere, used for containment and disbursement of airborne
pathogens and directed to the inhaler.
In the experiments, the volunteers were “ordered onto
wooden platforms at various levels. When the atmospheric
conditions were right… medical officers conducting the tests put
on their gas masks and radioed to overhead aircraft to commence
dispersing the infectious agent onto the test sight.”82 The purpose
of the experiment was to acquire “dose-response data on… Q-fever
in humans.”83 After being exposed to the infecting bacteria,
Coxiella burnetii, the men returned to Fort Detrick for
“monitoring and observation.”84 Exposure to C. burnetii can cause
fever, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, chills, sweat, weakness, and
malaise. When the men returned to Fort Detrick, they “were left to
develop fever for three days before antibiotic therapy was
initiated.”85 Q-fever investigations were “terminated… in 1956
after yielding the first scientific data of its kind, gathered by U.S.
military investigations from experiments conducted on human
volunteer subjects.”86 Tigertt and Beneson (another doctor
involved in the experiments) published the results of the Q-fever
tests in Transactions of the Association of American Physicians in
1956.
When tests for CD-22 were terminated, a new phase of
tests was to begin but with a much broader scope. Project
Operation Whitecoat was designed to test:
The vulnerability of man to biological agents;
prevention and treatment of BW (biowarfare)
casualties; and identification of biological agents.
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Information such as the minimum infectious
dosage, effectiveness of prophylactic and
therapeutic measures, serologic responses to
infection and the effects of various doses of
inoculum, eventually provided answers to most
initial questions contained within the research
objectives.87
Again, Camp Detrick would serve as the experimental test center.
Camp Detrick came into existence in the early 1940s and was
intended to serve as a large-scale, militarized research facility. The
location was ideal because of it’s close proximity to Washington
DC and the Edgewood Arsenal, a chemical warfare research
center.88 Camp Detrick, officially named in April 1943, was the
center for early military research of “vaccines, toxoids, antibiotics,
disinfectants, and antiseptics… all the while developing techniques
for detecting, sampling, and identifying many pathogens and their
toxic products. Simultaneously, sterilization procedures and
decontamination protocols required development and
improvement.”89 The termination of CD-22 and the beginning of
Project Operation Whitecoat coincided with the changing of name
from Camp Detrick to Fort Detrick, making it a permanent
facility.90
Project Operation Whitecoat was no secret to the SDA
community. In an October 17, 1966 issue of the North Pacific
Union Gleaner, an article was devoted entirely to POW. POW was
described as a study “aimed at developing protective measures
against disease-producing organisms which might be disseminated
by an enemy in the event biological warfare is ever used against
this country.”91 Even youth Bible lessons discussed POW. On
October 8 and 15, 1963, a two-part lesson plan was given on POW.
POW, “after eight… years of continuous work… is still going…
The project simply involves medical experimentation. But as a
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result of this activity the Army Medical Service has made material
advances in the development of suitable methods of prevention and
treatment of infectious diseases… Thus all citizens benefit from
the program, not only members of the armed forces.”92 It describes
the experience of Tom Kopko, a young GI, and his first
experiences as a POW volunteer. The article follows him from his
plane ride from Fort Detrick to his testing area. It describes a wind
experiment similar to the aforementioned CD-22 experiment.
When the conditions for the experiment were right, the experiment
commenced. After the experiment, the men were taken back to
their test center and “‘were told to remove our clothing as quickly
as possible. A warm shower came next… we then went through an
ultra-violet-light area and found ourselves in a room where our
regular Army clothes were waiting for us.’”93 The duration of the
individual test was short. When the men returned to Fort Detrick,
they were placed in isolation where they were monitored
throughout the day for several weeks or months, depending on the
individual.
Throughout the duration of POW, the volunteers “were
involved in 153 research projects to determine the safety of
vaccines and antibiotics and prevention and treatment of… Q
Fever, Tularemia, Sandfly Fever, Typhus Fever, Typhoid Fever,
Rift Valley Fever, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, Yellow Fever,
Plague, and Eastern, Western and Venezuelan Equine
Encephalitis.”94 Other tests and experiments sought to test the
effectiveness of protective materials such as masks and suits,
others endured hypothermia and sleep deprivation tests and other
tests sought to develop appropriate “decontamination processes…
[for use] in the space program, in hospitals, biological outbreaks
(e.g., present bioterrorism) and for the protection of research
workers.”95
The SDA church’s participation in POW did not go without
consequence or insult. In University Scope, the newspaper for
Loma Linda University, an article entitled “GC panel denies aid
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charge to biological warfare test” explains one of the more
prominent accusations against the church for its participation in
POW. During the turbulent social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s,
links between church and government brought heated debates and
accusations, one of which charged SDAs with helping the
government create biological weapons. In light of these attacks:
A committee of the General Conference of Seventhday Adventists, under the chairmanship of Neal C.
Wilson, vice-president of the North American
division, was appointed to investigate the project.
On September 11, Mr. Wilson and six other
members of the committee, including two
physicians, visited Fort Detrick and the
commanding officer of Project Whitecoat, Colonel
Daniel Crozier, U.S. Army.96
The committee visited Fort Detrick, acquired material evidence
and was to issue a report of its findings to Adventist colleges and
universities. Dr. Winton Beaven, one of the physicians on the
committee, was responsible for reporting the findings. When:
Speaking for the committee [he said], ‘…the project
has no relationship to…chemical or biological
warfare, either directly or indirectly… the Army
directive which established Project Whitecoat
clearly reads that it is related to defensive aspects in
developing… biological protective measures,
diagnostic procedures, and therapeutic methods…
None of the work in this project is used to improve
bacteriological weapons of the United States.’97
He stated that POW was not classified. He also stated that
professionals, both within and outside of the armed forces,
performed the tests that were based on sound research, and these
same professionals conducted the monitoring after the
96
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experiments. According to the article, Dr. Beaven explained,
criticism was being directed towards POW because its experiments
were being performed in the building adjacent to the one housing
the top-secret experimentation. According to Beaven, POW was
freely accessible and not top-secret.98 According to Clark Smith,
director of the NSO, “less than one percent of the Whitecoat work
is classified… the only reason so much remains unpublished is that
it is not complete.”99 As experiments were completed, many were
published in highly reputable journals. For example, in 1966, the
American Society for Microbiology published a POW study for
peer review. At the end of the article entitled “Antibiotic
Prophylaxis and Therapy of Airborne Tularemia,” the scientists
specifically stated “these studies were supervised by the
commission on Epidemiological Survey of the Armed Forces
Epidemiological Board. The cooperation of the War Service
Commission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church… [is]
gratefully acknowledged.”100
The church was greatly involved in the operations of POW.
When Tigertt went to Fort Sam Houston to recruit more SDAs to
POW, Elder Clark Smith of the NSO went with him to assure the
men that, while their service to this project was voluntary and up to
their own personal discretion, the church approved it as a form of
noncombatant service. When a man wanted to participate in POW,
he was interviewed to examine psychological health and was
requested to fill out a questionnaire provided by Elder Smith. An
SDA chaplain was allowed to be present during briefings and
interviews. The local SDA chaplain was provided with a finalized
list of POW participants “…for posting on [the] church bulletin
board.”101 Elder Smith was also allowed to answer questions
should they arise, and the local SDA chaplain helped arrange
housing for married recruits.
In an early U.S. Army Medical Research and Development
Command meeting regarding POW, Col. Tigertt knew right away
98
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that it was essential to maintain amicable terms between
USAMRIID and the SDA church. In the minutes of that meeting it
states “this relationship was essential to continue work at his
laboratory…”102 Tigertt felt that failing to keep up on their part of
the bargain would be a blow to the relations between the
government and the cooperation with the SDA church. Further, in
order to maintain these good relations, Col. Tigertt recommended
that those POW men who wished to stay on assignment after their
experiment be allowed to do so in order to gain medical
experience. According to Tigertt, “…these personnel are good
men, educated and in a number of cases will continue their
education in medicine… If it were the policy that personnel who…
participate in Operation Whitecoat would be denied the additional
specialized training… a large number of those personnel who had
ordinarily applied… would no longer apply.”103 By maintaining a
mutually beneficial relationship, USAMRIID would get the
volunteers it needed to conduct its research, the SDA church would
maintain its right to noncombatancy, and volunteers would be
allowed experience with medical research.
The church was even involved at the local level. Frederick
SDA Church, being the closest SDA church to Fort Detrick,
provided these men with a church community away from home.
Even though medical aid was seen as an acceptable form of ‘work’
on the Sabbath, POW volunteers got Saturdays off. Frederick SDA
church members Dr. Frank Damazo and his wife took it upon
themselves to take care of these fellow SDAs for the duration of
their stay, and the duration of the project itself. Very quickly, the
entire “…congregation provided interest, care, and support for all
Whitecoat members… This church gave special help to those men
and families nearby during the entire time the program was in
operation.”104 Frequently, potlucks and fellowships would be held
at church members’ homes so that the POW volunteers and church
members could have the opportunity to become acquainted on an
individual basis.
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Guarded Secret or Misunderstanding?
Because of the openness of the experiments and the ability for the
men involved to associate with other volunteers and people outside
of the experiment, there was no element of secrecy in POW. With
the wide variety of primary sources (both religious and secular)
offering articles and experimental research findings, it is seemingly
incomprehensible to conclude that POW was a secret government
experiment to create biological offensive weapons.
It was in the church’s best interest to maintain contact with
military personnel to ensure that their support of a particular
program was not given under false pretenses or inaccurate
information. It was also in the best interest of military personnel to
ensure that POW was performed with the utmost ethical standards.
The informed consent forms for volunteers were very explicit and
clear. The volunteer had written permission to “revoke… consent,
and withdraw from the study without prejudice.”105
Another clear indication of a difference between POW and
other military medical experiments is the bond and community that
POW test subjects still have today. POW volunteers have engaged
in reunions for approximately two and a half decades. Reunions
are typically alternated between east and west coast, with most east
coast reunions at Frederick SDA church. POW volunteers are not
anonymous; they have names, files, informed consent forms,
photographs, reunions, and mailing lists. If the military attempted a
secretive biological offensive warfare program with POW, then
they failed to do so. This is quite evident in the amount of
correspondence and literature that was out at the time: the church
leadership and the church members knew about it.
POW was created with the intent to serve as a defensive
measure against biological warfare. Whether or not information
acquired from POW was used as a measure of offensive biological
warfare is a matter of debate, but with all advancements in science,
information can be used as easily for both good and evil. Radiation
can be harmful, but when used effectively can cure cancer.
Surgical advancements in reproductive health can allow a couple
that no longer wishes to conceive to sterilize themselves, but
105
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people were forcibly sterilized in the early 20th century around the
globe for being genetically inferior. POW is no different from
these aforementioned examples. If the knowledge is there to help
someone, then the information can just as easily be construed to
harm someone. The dialectic of medical theory applies no more to
POW than it does to studies of other medical conditions.
POW was disbanded in 1973. Some sources indicate this
date because it was the year the draft ended. Others, however, cite
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 and the
resulting treaty calling for the end of all biological weapon
production, development and stockpiling as another possible
reason for the formal end of this program. However, if the latter of
the two options is correct in determining why POW ended, this is
disconcerting to those who believe POW to be directed for the
purpose of defensive measures. For according to the treaty, all
signatories must destroy or “divert to peaceful purposes” all
biological agents, toxins, weapons, etc.106 If POW were purely
defensive or peaceful, said treaty obligations would not have
applied to it. Further, no documentary evidence linking the two
events has been found. However, the end of the draft may also
have caused a disbanding in POW, as the end of conscription
would limit the influx of 1-A-Os, thereby depleting their exclusive
test group and necessitating a new, more open biological test
program, making it a much more viable reason for termination.
Conclusion
Presently, the SDA church’s position on the military has shifted
dramatically. While it still does not encourage its members to
actively enlist in the military, it recognizes free, individual choice.
Ideally, it would have its members serve in noncombatant roles,
but it does not castigate those who choose combatant roles; “while
the church ministers to noncombatant members in the army, as
well as to pacifists and combatants, it recognizes that individuals
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make free choices…”107 As a result, the SDA church is still
actively involved in its members’ military affairs. According to an
article in the SDA Biblical Research Institute website, theologian
Angel Rodriguez states, “when service in the military may result in
an open conflict with religious convictions… we [the church] must
be willing to enter into dialogue with government officials in an
effort to obtain for our members the right to practice their religious
convictions while in the military.”108
While some may question the church’s involvement in
government and/or military affairs, one thing remains certain: were
it not for the SDA church’s active involvement in Project
Operation Whitecoat, it is feasible that the many men who
volunteered could have become unidentifiable statistics and
numbers, without names, faces or voluntary consent forms, subject
to medical health uncertainties—anonymous, and only
remembered or represented as figures at a congressional hearing
for restitution and identification of former military medical
experiment test subjects. The SDA church played an important and
integral role in ensuring the ethical standards prescribed by the
Nuremburg Code and the Helsinki Declaration were followed in
the dealings with its members as test subjects in POW. Further
research is necessary to determine the full extent of church
involvement and to gain a clearer understanding of why POW was
disbanded. Doing so could prove that some U.S. government and
military experimentations were not buried under a dark shroud of
mystery and deception.
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A Watershed Event For a Watershed Community:
The Development of Flood Control for the Santa Ana
River Basin
BY ADAM SCOTT MILLER
ABSTRACT: Southern

California receives the vast majority of its
yearly rainfall in the relatively short time period between the
months of December and March. Occasionally, this intense
rainfall creates floods that have historically threatened and
devastated the communities of this region. The twentieth century
proved challenging for local flood control agencies. California
experienced tremendous population growth, resulting in migrants
settling on the existing floodplains. Unaware of the periodic,
hidden menace, newcomers were ruined when rivers and their
tributaries flooded. It became clear that a significant change in
flood control methods was required. In 1936, Congress passed the
Flood Control Act appropriating funds for flood control. The
Army Corps of Engineers took authority on flood control issues
and began investigating the best possible solutions to assist
communities like the Santa Ana River basin with the funds
Congress authorized. The Army Corps devised a plan that they
believed, at the time, was sufficient to protect Orange County.
However, in March of 1938 a major flood struck southern
California and demonstrated the need for a larger comprehensive
flood control program. Ultimately, the affect of this program was
the creation of immeasurable wealth for southern California.
Property values increased, as did property taxes. Land deemed
unusable because of floods could now be utilized. The creation of
a modern comprehensive flood control program greatly aided the
development of California’s economy—an economy which today
ranks 8th in the world. This is the story of the implementation of
modern flood control in the Santa Ana River basin and the
devastating storm that demonstrated the need for such
extraordinary measures.
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Southern California’s environmental faults are widely known;
these include prolonged drought periods, intense earthquakes,
destructive Santa Ana winds, and detrimental wildfires. Enormous
storms capable of producing floods seem to be the least of southern
California’s problems. In fact, if these disasters are ranked
thematically on the basis of concern today, flooding stands an
excellent chance of causing the least amount of anxiety for the
residents of southern California. Yet, if this question were
proposed 80 years ago, the flood nuisance would have caused the
foremost alarm and panic for the residents during that time period.
To prevent the annoyance of floods, the solution lay in updated
flood control projects.
Flooding was a way of life for the sparse population of
southern California in the 19th century. At the turn of the 20th
century, however, the Golden State grew in population to such an
extent that those affected by floods increasingly pled for help.
Because of rapid urbanization, it was difficult to maintain the
balance between nature and civilization, and the encroachment of
humanity into the floodplains was increasing. Policymakers were
forced to decide whether or not to appropriate funds to develop
long-term flood control projects. In a semiarid region, flood
control was only a concern when periodic intense rainfall occurred.
Flood control was viewed advantageously by most officials but
because floods only posed a temporary threat, the millions of
dollars required to develop flood systems was considered
impractical at that time. Additionally, not much was known about
the intervals at which flooding occurred. In other words, floods
happened unexpectedly and with varying strength; they could
strike two or three times in a decade or twenty years apart.
California’s lexicon categorizes floods into periods such as: 20year, 50-year, and 100-year floods. This means that, on average,
within those specified time frames a particular sized flood would
occur. The infrequent flood, like the 100-year flood, resulted in a
greater flood being produced than a flood that occurred during a
20-year interval. Because southern California covers thousands of
square miles and has a diverse topography, a storm’s intensity
could differ among the numerous regions within southern
California resulting in differentiated flooding. In other words, the
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Los Angeles basin could receive heavier rainfall than the San
Bernardino basin, causing a difference in flooding levels.
Southern California’s large, diverse regions made
implementation of flood control a complex issue that would
require unique solutions to each particular basin. Therefore, it
would be monotonous and tedious to discuss flood control on such
a grand scale, but a condensed perspective will establish significant
insight into the development of modern flood control. This paper
will focus on the Santa Ana River basin, which originates in the
San Bernardino and San Gabriel Mountains and continues through
San Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange Counties, and examine the
critical role the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers played in managing
and attaining flood works projects in a rapidly developing region.
Ultimately, a comprehensive flood control plan was approved,
providing a boost in usable land no longer subjected to floods.
This increased property values, which brought a great deal of
revenue back to the state in the way of property taxes.
The term flood control is synonymous with the Army
Corps of Engineers. To truly grasp the birth of modern flood
control a close investigative look is required of the Army Corps’
documents. At what point did flood control become modern?
Moreover, at what point did an aggressive approach to contain
flood waters occur? Often in history, a defining moment or catalyst
takes place that explains a sudden change in events. This
precipitating event took place in the month of March 1938 during
the Great Depression.
The 1938 flood happened at a crucial point in history,
bringing with it national attention and making the front-page
headlines in many states’ newspapers. In response to the
widespread devastation encountered by southern Californians,
Congress passed an additional flood control act directly benefiting
the Santa Ana basin. The 1938 flood effectively redefined flood
control in southern California. After the flood it was imperative
that the flooding be managed, not only to protect the citizens of
southern California, but for economic reasons.
This paper will show that the Army Corps of Engineers
played a vital role in the design of flood control and persuaded
lawmakers that short-term appropriations for flood works projects
would result in long-term savings. It will further argue that
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modern flood control was seen as an investment for the
government. Flood control is a complex issue, spanning thousands
of square miles and affecting different basin regions. The limited
scope of this paper will be confined to analyzing flood control
efforts in the Santa Ana River region, which includes the Inland
Empire and Orange County.
To comprehend the subject matter, a quick lesson in the
history of California’s flooding problem prior to 1938 will be
useful, as well as an overview of the role the Army Corps of
Engineers played—and still plays—in society. From that point the
paper will focus on events prior to the 1938 flood, then discuss
why the 1938 flood changed perceptions and led to modernized
flood control. Thereafter, the paper will delve into the construction
advancements that took place after 1938, and then reveal the
subsequent land-use benefits of flood control. The implementation
of a comprehensive flood control system is critical to explaining
the development of southern California’s shift from an agricultural
to industrial-based economy and the subsequent creation of
incredible wealth within the region.
Geographic Background
Flooding occurs in southern California because of an uneven
landscape. From the coastline, headed inland, the terrain gradually
slopes upwards until reaching the transverse mountain ranges,
which encompass the region and, thus, create a basin. In a mere
70-mile distance, the elevation soars from sea level to peaks of
over 10,000 feet. The two most prominent mountain ranges
affecting the Santa Ana basin are the San Bernardino and San
Gabriel Mountain range. The San Bernardino Mountain range’s
maximum height, at San Gorgonio peak, reaches 11,503 feet
(3,506 meters). West of the San Bernardino Mountains are the San
Gabriel Mountains. The highest point is at San Antonio’s peak,
also referred to as Mt. Baldy, at 10,068 feet (3,069 meters). The
picture below gives an excellent example of the Los Angeles basin.
The San Gabriel Mountains reach to the far right of the picture
cutting off the San Bernardino Mountain range.
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Figure 1. Enhanced Satellite Photo from Jet Propulsion Laboratories (JPL)
depicting steep transverse mountain ranges in comparison to the relatively flat
land of southern California.

Nevertheless, the enhanced satellite image, as a visual aid,
illustrates the formation of a basin in relation to steep mountain
ranges. Notice the Los Angeles River right of center next to the
L.A. Harbor as it makes its way to the San Gabriel Mountains and
the Santa Ana River at the far right. High elevations allow the
water to run off quickly and then form natural waterways. These
waterways or tributaries converge to form rivers like the Santa Ana
and Los Angeles River. Much like the ancient expression, “All
roads led to Rome,” all the Inland Empire’s tributaries lead to the
Santa Ana River, making it a formidable and potent river when
heavy rain occurred.
Tributary Problems
When addressing flood control, the Civil Works project focuses on
both the mainstream and lesser tributaries. For example, the Prado
Dam, completed in 1941, is located at a choke point on the Santa
Ana River, which restricts and minimizes water flow reaching into
Orange County. The Santa Ana River acts as an artery for water.
It is a combination of all the water collected from its tributaries.
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However, it is not the only factor contributing to regional floods.
Flooding affects regions miles away from the Santa Ana River.
Tributaries are the veins of the Santa Ana River and also unleash
havoc on local residents. Case in point, the San Timoteo Creek is a
tributary to the Santa Ana River. The two converge near the I-10
and I-215 freeways in the city of San Bernardino. Even within the
San Timoteo Creek other creeks converge on it like Wilson and
Wildwood Creek. When the region experiences heavy rainfall the
San Timoteo Creek overflows its banks and/or undermines
manmade levees, which leaves the residents of Loma Linda and
surrounding communities in turmoil. The photograph below
depicts a large wave as it approaches the Anderson Street Bridge in
Loma Linda during the February 1969 floods.1

Figure 2. Flood of February 1969. “Wave action approaching Anderson Street
Bridge” in Loma Linda, CA

The example of the San Timoteo Creek illustrates how dispersed
flooding can happen. Floods are not confined to just the main river
flow, but can also occur in the vicinity of the tributary. Therefore,
a comprehensive flood control plan needs to recognize and
undertake projects for both the mainstream and tributary
waterways in order to reduce the risk of floods.
1

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles District, Flood Plain Information:
San Timoteo Creek, Vicinity of Loma Linda San Bernardino County California,
June 1973. Prepared for San Bernardino County Flood Control District, 35.
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Southern California’s Population and Flood History
Southern California’s population began to change after 1900. Only
93,000 people lived in California just after the state gained
admission to the union in 1850. A half-century later that number
rose to 1.5 million and by 1960 almost 16 million people called
California their home.2 The 1920’s became a pivotal point for
population in southern California. The state’s population grew by
2 million during that decade. Most new migrants headed for
southern California because of new employment opportunities in
filmmaking, shipping, and manufacturing.3 Southern California
saw another wave of migrants in the 1930’s and 1940’s as well.
The Dust Bowl perpetuated the displacement of Midwest farmers
in 1930’s and over a million came to find work in the fertile
agricultural lands of California.4 The Pacific Front in World War
II brought an abundance of vital defense industry jobs to help in
the war effort. Out-of-work citizens throughout the country were
attracted to these new opportunities. Even after the war, the
defense industry beckoned newcomers to the state in search of
prosperity.5 In 1970, the census confirmed that California’s
population overtook New York as the largest in the union.6 The
state’s tremendous population growth required officials to
reexamine flood control. As the population soared so did new
housing, businesses, and other means of infrastructure to support
an urban sprawl. This unprecedented growth meant more people
and property were endangered when periodic flooding occurred.
Prior to the 1938 flood, the 1916 flood showed the disastrous
effects of a population encroaching on the flood plains.
The January 1916 flood was the first large event in the
twentieth century for the Santa Ana River basin. Two separate
storm systems each produced six consecutive, intensive days of
2
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rain that month. In total, January 1916 had 19 days of rain.7 In the
Santa Ana basin rainstorms of high intensity for short durations of
time caused severe flooding. In 1916, according to the U.S.
Weather Bureau, 16.71 inches of rain in a 24-hour period was
recorded at a small hotel, named the Squirrel Inn, located near the
crest of the San Bernardino Mountains. The concentrated rainfall
received at the Squirrel Inn demonstrates the tremendous
magnitude of some southern California storms.8 Such intense
rainfall swiftly descends to the base of the mountain and drains
into the already-enlarged Santa Ana River. Furthermore, the total
amount of water runoff is concentrated to a maximum of 20 square
miles of drainage area, thus creating a flood.9 Even natural lakes
such as Lake Elsinore overflowed.10 According to the Army Corps
the magnitude of a 1916 flood happened only once in every 30
years’ time.11 The total monetary loss due to the 1916 flood was
estimated at $7,580,000 million.12 Four people in Orange County
succumbed to the flood; in addition, five bridges were destroyed,
electric and telegraph services were interrupted, and a gas line
broke at the Chapman Street Bridge.13 In other regions, railroad
tracks, roads, homes, and orange groves washed away. Ontario,
Redlands, Anaheim, and other communities remained isolated; the

7
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flood eliminated all means of communication and transportation.14
Disneyland, referred to as, “the happiest place on earth” would
simply not exist in Anaheim if flooding persistently devastated the
city. The picture below is an example of how the population coped
with flooding.

Figure 3. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
“Evacuating the Mexican quarter, 4th and Artesia, Santa Ana, CA.”

The Role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
The Army Corps of Engineers plays a vital role managing Federal
mandated projects, tracing their roots back to Chief Engineer
Colonel Richard Gridley. In 1775, Colonel Gridley oversaw the
fortifications for the Battle of Bunker Hill during the American
Revolution.15 The Corps’ function has significantly increased over
time. The Corps’ primary focus was designing military
fortifications, such as Bunker Hill and Fort McHenry, but
gradually their responsibilities expanded in the newly developing
nation.16 In the nineteenth century, the Army Corps continued to
build fortifications, but also began surveying roads, canals, and the
14
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western frontier. They oversaw the design and construction of
monuments and buildings in the nation’s capitol.17 In the twentieth
century, especially after World War II, the Army Corps turned
their attention to non-defense activities focusing, for example, on
shoreline projects. They engineered and improved major shipping
harbors, in addition to smaller harbors used for pleasure craft.
Developing harbors drastically changed the function of the Army
Corp of Engineers.18 As a federal agency, the Army Corps’
primary focus was for the benefit of the nation. Therefore, it was
involved in the construction of interstate projects such as navigable
waterways—not state and local projects, such as marinas.
However, in 1932 Congress amended the River and Harbor Act of
1902 to include the phrase, “’the use of waterways by seasonal
passenger craft, yachts, house boats, fishing boats, motorboats and
similar craft whether or not operated for hire.’”19 Slowly, the
Corps’ authority reached to localized areas within a state, and was
no longer restricted to projects spanning state lines where
jurisdiction problems could occur. The Army Corps steadily
became the federal government’s authority on water, taking the
responsibilities out of state and local hands. From building
harbors, marinas, and dams it would only be a matter of time
before the Army Corps added flood control to their extensive
resume.
In 1936 Congress passed the Flood Control Act, which
authorized the federal government to take responsibility for flood
control activities.20 Instead of creating a new agency on flood
control, Congress assigned the Secretary of War, who oversees the
Army Corps of Engineers, to the task of building flood control
structures. The Act appropriated $320 million for 250 projects and
surveys throughout the nation to boost the national economy.21 For
the people living in the Santa Ana River basin, this meant help was
on the way.
When the Army Corps began their investigation of the
Santa Ana River basin, they quickly discovered the “deficiency” of
17
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information compiled by local officials on the behavior of flooding
rivers and tributaries.22 In essence, the Army Corps started from
scratch without any previous knowledge of how much water
flowed at a given point in the waterways. In March of 1938, the
Army Corps of Engineers was coincidentally blessed when they
received their immense study case: a rare 100-year flood. From
that point on, the Army Corps took the lead role in a progressive
flood control effort. Today, according to the Army Corp of
Engineers, “[their] mission areas include planning, designing,
building, and operating water resources and other civil works
projects… providing immediate and long-term support to the
public during natural disasters and national emergencies.”23 Thus,
the Army Corps emerged as an authority on waterworks projects
and continues to maintain their presence as a principal engineering
organization in this field.
The past acts as a window to the future allowing us to
compare floods to one another. A storm’s intensity is always
variable and there is a great deal of uncertainty as to when another
large flood will occur. In that regard, floods are very much like
earthquakes. Therefore, it is important for researchers to identify
which flood was historically the largest, not necessarily in terms of
the most destruction, but which flood created the most discharge of
water. Identifying this flood will give the Army Corps of
Engineers a benchmark so they can, in turn, develop flood control
to meet that point of reference.
In an effort to better understand California’s past flooding
the Army Corps began looking at prior reports delineating the
different floods. They turned to a report compiled on September
21, 1931 named “Big Tujunga Creek” written by consulting
engineer Franklin Thomas.24 The records indicated that 34 floods
occurred in a period of 168 years, giving an average expectancy of
one flood occurring in southern California every five years.25 The
historical data Thomas used for his report was previous rainfall
22
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records, Mission Priests’ reports, and notes in explorers’ diaries.26
The data also indicated that the flood of 1861-62 was considered to
be the greatest flood on record. A chart created by the San
Bernardino County Flood Control District analyzes past floods by
the amount of water that discharged through a place known as the
Riverside Narrows. The graph, below, clearly illustrates the 186162 flood as being “off the chart” compared to other floods. In
addition, the 1862 flood had three times more water discharge
through the Riverside Narrows than the 1938 study case.

Figure 4. The chart represents past discharge rates of water on the Santa Ana
River at the Riverside Narrows location.

The primary question arising from using this chart is: How were
these measurements gathered in 1862? First hand witnesses wrote
what they experienced during the flood:
There were billows 50 feet high. The waters from
the vast drainage area found themselves forced
26
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abruptly into a narrow channel, and just above Agua
Mansa the river filled the valley from bluff to bluff,
reaching the little church. Father Borgoatta, then
the pastor, heard the roar in the distance, rang the
bell frantically and the people fled to high ground.
Some of the last ones had to swim.
For scientists, the crucial part of the text is the description of the
Santa Ana’s water flow reaching the “little church.” The church’s
location was known when the Army Corp compiled their data. To
legitimize the story about the little church the Corps retrieved
helpful information from Mr. Celso Robidoux, grandson of Louis
Robidoux, an early settler of Riverside.27 In fact Louis Robidoux
purchased the region known as Jurupa from a man named Don
Benito Wilson between 1846-1848.28 Wilson, an early
pioneer/mountain man, helped develop and soon became the
second mayor of Los Angeles. The land he sold to Louis Robidoux
was named Rancho Jurupa, part of greater Riverside, located in
and around the city of current day Rubidoux and the location of
Agua Mansa Mission, where the little church of San Salvador
lay.29 30 The Corps’ documents state Mr. Celso Robidoux:
Accompanied engineers to the site of Agua Mansa
Mission and identified landmarks which had been
pointed out to him in childhood by his parents,
which then showed evidences of the 1862 flood. He
corroborated the high water level which of that
flood at Agua Mansa as determined from other
sources by the Advisory Committee on Flood
Control in San Bernardino County, and told of the
sweeping away of settlements and cultivated lands,
evidences of which he saw in his boyhood. The
peak discharge of Santa Ana River at Agua Mansa,
27
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computed by engineers of the agency referred to
above, was 338,000 c.f.s. on January 22, 1862.31
Other first-hand accounts gathered by the Army Corps for their
report describe the following:
In the town of Anaheim, four miles from the river,
the water ran four feet deep and spread in an
unbroken sheet to the Coyote hills, three miles
beyond. The inhabitants sought safety in the second
stories of their houses, and those who were not
fortunate enough to have an upper story quartered
themselves upon those who had. One unfortunate
was carried down by the current and drowned.32
The above story mentions that the floodwater was four feet deep
four miles away from the Santa Ana River. The magnitude of this
flood sounds astonishing, almost unbelievable to those that had not
experienced a large flood. The March flood would legitimize these
incredible stories. The rain that produced this flood started on
December 25, 1861 and continued for 25 consecutive days, ending
on January 18, 1862.33 The information the Army Corps of
Engineers acquired from a reliable source about the 1861-62 flood
establishes the benchmark that flood control structures would need
to withstand.
The above graph is also helpful when analyzing the
outcomes of the 1938 flood; a flood that was pivotal in
determining the levels of flood control necessary in southern
California. For example, no other flood after 1938 is equivalent in
water discharge, but three floods prior to 1938 were equal or
greater than the 1938 flood at the measurements taken at the
Riverside Narrows. This comparison illustrates how the old
system of flood control became outdated and a new “modern”
31
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approach was implemented, making a difference in the graph.
These changes were necessary since a significant population
growth was occurring in California.
With a general understanding of the cosmetic makeup of
southern California and past flooding history, in addition to
comprehending the function of the Army Corps of Engineers, this
paper will narrow its scope to examine the flooding events prior to
1938 and analyze the Army Corps’ study on the Santa Ana River
basin. The Army Corps gathered evidence to demonstrate the
benefits of flood control in the Santa Ana River basin. By no
means does this paper suggest that flood control never existed in
southern California. In fact, local agencies attempted to subdue
and channel water runoff for more than 80 years prior to 1937.34
They built, maintained, and improved channels from time to time
in order to manipulate the flow of water caused by seasonal rain
for drinking and irrigation purposes. Despite these efforts, on
occasion the flood menace struck and overwhelmed the manmade
devices, crippling the swelling communities. The Army Corp
classified these existing flood control structures to withstand floods
of five to eight year intervals.35 Not until Congress authorized the
federal government to finance flood control projects did the Army
Corp of Engineers intercede on existing flood problems to find
long-term comprehensive solutions for the benefit of the cities,
states, and the nation.
Flood Control Before the March 1938 Flood
When the Army Corps of Engineers began their investigation into
flood control in 1937 they asked district flood control agencies to
compile reports explaining how they perceived flood control and
the flood menace. Flood Control Engineer for Orange County M.
N. Thompson wrote such a report for the County Board of
34

Major Theodore Wyman, Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District, April 15,
1937, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif., page 10; Santa Ana
River, CA FC-Hydraulics April 15, 1937; box 160; RG 77, NARA.
35
Wyman, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif.,” 9.

111

A Watershed Event

Supervisors and the Army Corps. His report reverted back to the
impacts of the 1916 flood and stressed the future impacts on the
Orange County area:
Since 1916 the development of the District has
proceeded at a rapid rate. The population has more
than doubled the assessed valuation [(property
values)] has increased more than 300%. More than
half the present inhabitants have no personal
knowledge of the area that would be overflowed or
the resulting damage. Intense cultivation, brought
about by high returns from citrus fruits and other
crops, has extended to land where flood waters once
had the opportunity of spreading without causing
much damage…The financial losses that would
result under the present conditions, from a flood
similar to that of 1916 would not only cause
hardship to owners and residents of the lands and
improvements directly concerned, but would affect
the County as a whole. Funds for the repair of flood
damaged public property must come from taxes,
and to make up the deficiency in tax returns from
private property, reduced in value from flood
damage, the tax rate on other property of the County
must necessarily be increased.36
Exponential population growth in southern California was the core
problem according to Chief Engineer Thompson’s report. A
flood’s increasing capability of causing destruction is linked
directly to the upsurge of population. With every new flood, the
damage becomes more severe and costly to southern Californians.
For example, an Army Corps’ report reiterates these facts by
providing additional evidence:
The flood damage measured in dollars has increased
somewhat out of proportion to the severity of the
36
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several floods reported, owing to the extensive
development that has taken place since 1862 and
1884. Over large areas in the cities and towns about
30 to 60 percent of the ground surface has been
covered by buildings, paved streets, sidewalks,
etc.37
As the population continued to grow and encroach on the flood
plains of the Santa Ana River basin, it became apparent to officials
that the region needed updated flood control structures. The
ongoing replacement of temporary wooden bridges, like those lost
in 1916, had to change. Not necessarily because of the monetary
loss, but the various counties’ increasing populations could no
longer afford to lose crucial transportation infrastructure.38 This
was especially relevant since America’s infatuation with the
automobile began to materialize. As a result, the need to control
unpredictable floods became much greater than before. Temporary
wooden bridges would not suffice in the wake of the 1916 flood,
which according to Army Corps “forced the thickly populated
communities into quite serious circumstances.”39 Natural water
channels proved too challenging to control. When floods occurred,
water overflowed its natural channels and created a new path to
reach the ocean. For the cities located in the Santa Ana River
basin to further develop, the necessity of carefully engineered
flood control devices was required. A comprehensive approach to
manage a multi-county problem fell to the hands of the Army
Corps of Engineers.
Under the 1936 Flood Control Act, Congress authorized the
Army Corps of Engineers to take charge in surveying and
developing flood control projects. Before Congress appropriated
money to the Santa Ana River basin, the Army Corps had to
survey the land, suggest improvements, and analyze the region’s
37
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economy and population. Army Corps Los Angeles District
engineer, Major Theodore Wyman Jr. composed a report dated
April 15, 1937 entitled, Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River
and other streams, for the protection of the metropolitan area in
Orange County, Calif., calling for Congressional approval to
allocate funds for improvements on the Santa Ana River and its
tributaries.40 Wyman asserted that his report was, “…submitted as
a basis for consideration of plans for flood control works for the
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, California
authorized by Section 5 of Act of Congress, Public No. 738,
approved June 22, 1936.”41
From this point on, the Army Corps began to build a case
on behalf of those affected by floods on the Santa Ana River basin,
but only for those residents living in Orange County. His report did
not include studies of Riverside or San Bernardino Counties where
the Santa Ana River originates. Initially, Congress must have
singled out Orange County specifically to protect from floods, not
realizing the vast amounts of terrain that contributed to the flood
problem. After investigating the causes of flooding in Orange
County, Major Wyman concluded that the required protection
Orange County (lower basin) needed would not even be located in
the County itself, but upstream in Riverside and San Bernardino
Counties (upper basin).42 Major Wyman immediately broadened
the area of flood control on the Santa Ana River. He argued that in
addition to protecting Orange County it was necessary to consider
the upper Santa Ana River basin, since past floods had caused loss
of life and a significant destruction of property in that area as
well.43 “In the upper basin, bridges have been destroyed, channels
eroded, and debris deposited on the improved areas near the
mountains; in the lower basin in Orange County the greatest
damage has been from overflow, erosion and deposition of debris
on large areas occupied by cities, towns and citrus groves.”44 Thus,
the Army Corps Los Angeles District engineer Major Theodore
Wyman was instrumental in incorporating Riverside and San
40
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Bernardino Counties in a comprehensive plan for flood control
along the entire Santa Ana River.
The Army Corps’ 1937 report proposed that a crucial dam
should be built in the upper basin of the Santa Ana River to protect
Orange County. The Prado Dam became the centerpiece of flood
control along the Santa Ana River and essentially restrained the
mighty river during major storms. First proposed in April 1931 by
Orange County Flood Control District’s general plan for flood
control, the Army Corps of Engineers agreed with the dam’s
location and adopted Orange County Flood Control’s method to
contain floodwaters.45 The 1936 Flood Control Act allotted $13
million for Orange County flood control projects, and the Army
Corps recommended the appropriation of the funds.46 The Prado
Dam would be completed in May 1941 for $9,450,000, as a result
of the 1936 Flood Control Act.47 The remaining money was spent
widening channels. In addition, Chief Engineer Wyman believed
$18,000,000 ($13.2 million federal and $4.6 million local
contribution) was sufficient to establish flood works projects.
However, the various county governments viewed flood control
differently. After Wyman’s report was released (1937) and days
before the March flood, local agencies asserted their belief that
$44,525,600 was required for full protection from the Santa Ana
River and its tributaries above the Prado Dam site in Riverside and
San Bernardino Counties.48 The subsequent flood affirmed for the
local communities the need to suppress the flood menace.
Another interesting aspect the Army Corps’ report
examines is the monetary value of the regions they proposed to
protect. In 1937, were the areas affected by flooding in the Santa
Ana River basin worth protecting? Were they of enough
sustainable value to warrant using federal money to ensure
protection? From 1940 to 1970 the southern California economy
shifted from an agricultural to an industrial base. Population and
45
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property values soared and so did the need to protect them.
According to Major Wyman’s 1937 report, the assessed value of
land to be protected in San Bernardino was estimated at $111
million; the highest of the counties affected by the Santa Ana and
Los Angeles River.49
An important question arises when analyzing the Army
Corps’ reports: what is the correlation between the value of a
county’s land and flood control? Foremost, flood control is for the
protection of the people. A group letter composed by Major
Wyman on January 25, 1938 titled, “Notice of Public Hearing”
held on February 25, 1938 in Riverside, CA reiterates this fact. In
a list of requirements, bullet point “c” states, “The economic and
other justification for the expenditures that may be entailed by the
desired improvements, based upon: Saving of life and protection
to property, improvement to drainage, conservation of water, the
development of power.”50 However, concern eventually shifted
from a strict focus on saving lives and property to other beneficial
factors—for example, how the government might benefit from
investing funds in flood control. At the heart of this argument are
property taxes.
Visualizing the devastation the Santa Ana River basin
experiences periodically, one can obviously see how floods hinder
the government’s ability to prosper. The population in southern
California was growing immensely during this time period and,
therefore, it was presumed the economy of southern California was
experiencing the same level of growth. An investor could see the
increasing prosperity as an investment. The federal government is
the investor and flood control is the investment. Yet, property taxes
create revenue for state and local governments. How, then, does
the federal government benefit from subsidizing flood control? To
elaborate, the basic function of Congress needs to be evaluated.
The framework describing the Legislative Branch’s basic function
may sound elementary, but is critical in order to comprehend the
49
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federal government’s interests in flood control. Congress is
comprised of representatives from within a state. The Senate
serves the state as a whole and the House of Representative’s
members serve the individual districts. Representatives have a
vested interest in their district. By protecting areas from the flood
nuisance, property values increase, thus benefiting their district.
Beginning with Major Wyman’s 1937 report, the Army
Corps introduced direct and indirect benefits of flood control that
soon became a major theme in flood control projects. The Corps’
first report to Congress in 1937 briefly mentioned the increase of
land values as a direct benefit of flood control. The Army Corps
realized that if the Santa Ana River was tamed and disastrous
floods occurred less frequently, then property values and property
tax revenue would increase. However, the Army Corps
acknowledged that their investigative role in 1937 was to devise a
flood control plan with $13 million—not analyze the benefits of
flood control. Nevertheless, the report states, “Although a
comparison of economic benefits with economic costs is not
considered necessary, because the works of improvement have
been authorized by Congress, the following is submitted for
purpose of record.”51 The report predicted that after new modern
flood control improvements were completed, Orange County
would experience greater security from flooding, thus increase
property values by $480,000 on average per year.52 Furthermore,
the report mentions a crucial indirect benefit when modern flood
control is implemented for southern California. The 1937 report,
with foresight reads:
In addition to the direct increase in value due to the
removal of the flood menace, there would be an
indirect benefit from additional future
improvements in the area now subject to overflow,
due to change to a higher use. These
51
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changes…would create an increase in taxable
wealth, not otherwise obtainable. No estimates
have been made of the value of such indirect
benefits.53
Unbeknownst to Major Wyman, California’s growth would
continue to multiply decade after decade nearly doubling between
1950 and 1970.54 When the report was written just prior to the
1940 census, California’s population stood slightly under 7
million; according to the 2000 census California’s population
reached almost 34 million residents.55 Today, California’s
economy is ranked 8th in the world, which directly relates to the
diversely skilled population.56 There is a direct correlation between
California’s economy, flood control, and the ability to support a
growing population. Major Wyman’s report predicted an indirect
benefit between flood control and future developments on the
Santa Ana floodplain. Land that was not usable prior to modern
flood control would be utilized to house residents and support
various businesses, thus creating incredible, taxable wealth. With
hindsight, the 1938 flood changed the perception of flood control
on the Santa Ana River basin. The 1937 report speculated on the
possible damage to the region that could be caused by future floods
of the magnitude of the one in 1916. Their predictions can then be
compared to the outcomes of the 1938 flood.
Floods are evaluated on two criteria: magnitude and
destructiveness. To predict the outcomes of future flooding, both
parts need to be evaluated separately. Historically speaking, the
two conditions are not interlinked. For instance, the 1862 flood
had the largest magnitude of any known documented flooding, yet
the destructiveness was less than that of the 1916 flood, which had
53
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a lesser magnitude. The missing part in this equation is
population. The Army Corps of Engineers needed to analyze all
three factors to calculate damage from future floods. Because of
the intensive development of land on the Santa Ana River basin, a
flood occurring in 1936 could be more destructive and, therefore,
more costly than the 1916 flood, even if of a lesser magnitude.57 In
their calculations, the Army Corps estimated a maximum probable
flood on the Santa Ana River in Orange County of more than twice
the magnitude of the 1916 flood.58
Under time constraints to submit the report, evidence had
yet to be gathered to determine damages for Riverside and San
Bernardino Counties.59 If a flood with the same magnitude as the
1916 flood struck in 1936, the Army Corps estimated the damage
in Orange County would be approximately $4 million.60 In
addition, the hypothetical flood would, without a doubt, cause a
loss of life between 40 to 50 residents of Orange County.61 The
Army Corps’ initial investigation came to a close less than a year
before the 1938 flood. Their estimates of damages from a future
flood in comparison with the magnitude of the 1916 flood doubled
the amount of property damage and caused ten times the loss of
life. The flood experienced by the residents of southern California
and studied by the Army Corps of Engineers forever changed a
region decimated by periodic flooding.
News spread throughout the Santa Ana River basin that the
Army Corps of Engineers had begun a comprehensive
investigation to improve flood control. Local governments and
water districts cooperated with the Army Corps by disclosing any
information the Corps requested. Moreover, local businesses
submitted their perspectives and dilemmas when faced by floods.
For example, in a letter dated February 34, 1938, days before the
March flood, addressed to Chief Engineer Major Wyman,
Pellissier Dairies in Riverside, gave their assessment of how the
Santa Ana River affects the dairy’s operations. Pellissier Dairies
57
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attempted to warn Major Wyman that if another flood like those in
previous years occurred, not only would it result in a loss of life,
but the Santa Ana River, at flood levels, would eat away the
dairy’s property, hurting the business.62
Another business affected by floods in the Santa Ana River
basin was the Italian Vineyard Company located in Guasti, CA.
Guasti is located slightly north of present-day Ontario Airport. In a
letter dated February 24, 1938 the company stated that during
floods, the Santa Ana’s tributaries, which passed through the
property, slowly eroded parts of the vineyard’s immense 5,000acre property.63 The vineyard claimed, “ in order for us to put this
property back in shape it will be necessary that we cut a straight
channel through one hundred sixty (160) acres, putting us to quite
a bit of expense.”64 What the letter fails to say but implies is that
the vineyard wants the Army Corps to appropriate funds to build
the concrete channel with federal money. Moreover, the letter
recommended that the Army Corp not build a concrete channel
from the foothills directly to the Santa Ana River, but to first add a
“spreading area” or catch basin to allow water to sink underground
and be conserved.65
In fact, most of the area’s drinking and irrigation water
came from underground artesian well sources known as aquifers in
the Santa Ana basin.66 M. A. Martinez, General Superintendent of
Italian Vineyards and author of the letter, showed concern that if
the Army Corps decided to build a concrete channel per his
suggestion, water would not have a chance to percolate
underground. Thus, the ability to conserve water in a semi-arid
region would be diminished, as would the agricultural business. In
the region, water is a scarce commodity but also destructive when
floods occur. Since most of the region was agricultural based,
landowners depended on the slow meandering water flow, but
62
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when the Army Corps proposed building channels to expediently
evacuate the water to the Pacific Ocean, “much litigation resulted
from the objections.”67 In summary, the balance between natural
conservation and protective flood control needed to be reached.
The Army Corp of Engineers held a meeting to discuss the
problems arising from these multi-county dilemmas in Riverside
on February 25, 1938, just days before the March flood.
Riverside proved a halfway point for the areas affected by
the Santa Ana River. The public meeting allowed the numerous
water agencies and businesses affected by floods to discuss their
concerns about water rights. In addition, they proposed their
solution for flood control. An Army Corps 1939 report stated:
According to testimony and data presented at the public
hearing:
At Riverside, California, on February 25, 1938,
local interests desire that flood control
improvements combined with improvements for
maximum practicable water conservation be made
in the basin of the Santa Ana River to provide
protection to all localities now exposed to flood
damage. The improvements desired include seven
reservoirs for reduction of flood peaks, and
numerous debris basins, channel improvements,
storm drains, and spreading grounds, the total cost
of which, as estimate by local interests, is
$44,525,600. This cost is based primarily on the
type of structure, which they considered adequate
prior to the March 1938 flood.68
In 1937 Major Wyman believed $18 million would provide
“adequate flood control for the metropolitan area of Orange
County,” but local officials believed the cost to be more than
67
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double the Major’s estimate.69 A week later, the March flood
reaffirmed the local agencies prediction. All three factors
determining the outcome of a flood were put to the test in March
1938: magnitude, population, and destructiveness. The results
were astonishing. The March flood became a wake-up call for
change. The flood forced the Army Corp of Engineers to reexamine how to implement a more powerful system of flood
control. More projects were needed, and therefore stronger support
from the federal government was required.
By March of 1938 preparations for a comprehensive flood
control plan began to take shape. Congress approved eight crucial
projects after Major Wyman’s April 15, 1937 report.70 Days before
the rain began, concerned businesses implored the Army Corps of
Engineers to help limit the potential damage that could be caused
by the Santa Ana River. The Army Corp of Engineers and
Department of Agriculture organized a meeting in Riverside,
February 24, 1938 attended by the counties who had a vested
interest in the Santa Ana River.71 The counties were brought
together to discuss a comprehensive approach to flood control, to
talk about concerns, find solutions, and resolve their differences.
However, the litigious nature of feuding counties over water rights
caused delays in building flood control structures. The various
counties’ flood control agencies had a grander approach to flood
control than the novices at the Army Corps of Engineers, yet it
required the involvement of the Army Corps to put a
comprehensive plan in place. This lack of coordination between
counties was presumably rooted in cross-county suspicions.
Orange County’s fix to the flood lay in Riverside
County—with the construction of Prado Dam—and this caused
anxiety between the two counties. Why would Orange County pay
for a dam not even located in their county? On the other hand,
69
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what purpose would the Prado Dam serve for Riverside County?
The purpose of the dam was to restrict the flow of floodwater by
allowing it to collect behind the dam and then regulate its
discharge into Orange County. Once Federal authorities took
jurisdiction on the matter, disputes between county authorities,
such as the dispute between Orange and Riverside Counties over
the Prado Dam, disappeared. The Army Corps provided the
necessary funds (appropriated by Congress) which neither county
wanted to appropriate for the construction of Prado Dam. Changes
in flood control began slowly, but made progress. On February 27,
1938 rain began to fall over a fearfully concerned region abused by
floods. The resulting March flood would accelerate the
development of flood control.
The Flood
The March flood will be discussed in several different ways. The
first goal is to focus on the basic facts of the storm. The magnitude
of the storm is crucial because it illustrates the intensity needed to
produce a catastrophic flood. The second objective is to analyze
the human impact of the flood vis-à-vis the destruction and loss of
life caused by the flood. The widespread devastation affected
every county in southern California. Newspapers in various states
ran front-page stories, which informed their readers about the
horrors faced by the residents. The March flood demonstrated to
the nation the need to protect the growing state of California.
Finally, the Army Corps studied the flood to see how the Santa
Ana River basin behaves during such events. Their investigation of
the March flood changed the Army Corps’ perspective on flood
control. The original eight project plan proved insufficient for the
Army Corps. A new, extensive investigation began as a result of
the 1938 flood.
Three separate storms brutalized the southern California
landscape beginning February 27 and ending March 3, 1938.
According to the Los Angeles Weather Bureau, the intensity
increased between each storm.72 The greatest recorded rainfall
72
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during the storm period was 32.2 inches at Kelly’s Kamp in the
San Gabriel Mountains: 17.55” fell in a 24-hour period.73 In
addition, the average rainfall in the mountain ranges varied
between 20 and 30 inches.74 San Bernardino received 5.47”,
Riverside reported 5.26”, and Anaheim collected 8.63” over the
four-day period.75 The severity of the flood reached its pinnacle on
the last day because a warm tropical air front brought tremendous
rainfall and raised the altitude of snowfall.76 The Santa Ana River
and its tributaries absorbed 56 percent of the mountain and foothill
run-off above the Prado Dam site, raising the water table, but they
reached their breaking point when the final storm unleashed its
power.77 Harold Willis, former president of San Bernardino’s city
Water Board and eyewitness to the March flood at age eleven was
quoted in the local newspaper in 2003 claiming, “We had this cold,
cold winter… the snow stacked up and stacked up. Then we had
this warm rain come in from the south. The snow was like a huge
sponge. It caught all the water and could hold no more, and it
turned to slush and just came right on down.”78 As a result, the
tributaries overflowed and levies breached on the Santa Ana River
causing widespread devastation and loss of life.
The heavily saturated mountains brought down untold
amounts of debris. Debris included, silt, rocks, and foliage, which
covered many parts of the counties. The Lytle Creek community
located on the San Gabriel Mountain side of the Cajon Pass
received incredible damage. A mountain community named after
the tributary, Lytle Creek, washed away 200 cabins tearing the
community apart.79 At the Lytle and City Creek, and Santa Ana
River junction lays the communities of San Bernardino and Colton
http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/rescue.mwr/066/mwr-066-05-0139.pdf (accessed
12/14/2009).
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where the flood destroyed between 200 and 300 homes.80 In San
Bernardino County a hundred bridges collapsed and two miles of
railroad track were undermined, crippling the rail system.81 The
flood not only brought quick moving destructive water, but vast
amounts of debris that adversely affected the communities. The
Army Corps gathered hundreds of photos of the Santa Ana River
and tributaries flooding devastation and compiled them in a report
titled “Photographs of Damage from Storm of February 27-March
3, 1938.”82 The photos themselves provide an excellent pictorial
record, capturing the detail and widespread damage incurred by the
March flood.

Figure 5. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
“View of damaged cabins in Lytle Creek below Glenn Ranch, after March 1938
flood.”
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Figure 6. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
“Upstream view of damage in Lytle Canyon at 17.8 miles below Glenn Ranch,
after March 1938 flood.”

Figure 7. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
Photo taken 3/3/1938. Merging point of Lytle Creek and Santa Ana around the
City of Colton. Notice the bridge failures.
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Figure 8. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
Photo taken 3/3/1938 View from Orange County looking west. Notice the
breach in the levy submerging nearby cities in water.

Figure 9. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
Photo taken 3/3/1938. View from Orange County looking west.
Notice the mouth of the Santa Ana River to the top-left.
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Figure 10. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at Riverside.
Picture was taken 3/3/1938 by the Army Corps illustrates widespread flooding
over Northern Orange County looking northwest. Notice the flood waters
reflection-covering most of the County.

The 1938 March flood devastated southern California.
These images are just snap-shots of the areas affected by the Santa
Ana River and its tributaries, but the flood’s destructiveness
impacted the Los Angeles community as well. Total damage and
loss of life figures vary depending on which source one examines.
The San Mateo Times headlines on March 4, 1938 read, “Death
Toll Now Near 250.”83 The Nevada State Journal claimed 400
dead on March 6, 1938.84 In recent years the death toll is still
debated. An article appearing in The Press-Enterprise indicates
that the number of dead was at least 175 people, but recognizes
that the “death toll is difficult to pin down.”85 The reporter refers to
Suzie Earp,86 who at the time (2003) was a master’s student at
83
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California State San Bernardino, “it’s hard to know…just how
many people died…’this was the Depression…and a lot of people
were camped out by the river. We don’t have any official
numbers.’”87 In addition, to the above statement another perception
arises to help uncover the reasons why an official death toll was
not sought after. An article written by the Nevada State Journal on
March 6, 1938, about the southern California flood, reveals the
racial attitudes of the time period. The article reads, “The Red
Cross spokesman said: ‘You must realize that most of the dead are
Mexicans, and when one of their race disappears, they are not
likely to report the disappearance.’”88 This quote is a prime
example of racial stereotyping during that era. Therefore, it can be
assumed organizations like the Red Cross may not have fully
investigated the specific total of causalities caused by the flood
because of racial indifference.
Another aspect of flood damage is the monetary costs of
such an event. These numbers too vary depending on the source.
The City of Ontario, CA Risk Management department currently
compiled historical data estimating $78,602,000 in damages and 87
deaths resulted from of the March 1938 flood.89 The Army Corps
of Engineers estimated the direct and indirect damages at
$48,133,278 in 1939. Today (2010) that converts to approximately
$740 million.90 The Army Corps figure of $48 million is twelvetimes greater than their 1936 prediction of $4 million. Even though
the Army Corps calculated their predictions to a 1916 caliber
flood, the 1938 flood was not twelve-times the magnitude (see
figure 3). The numbers vary between the death toll and financial
loss incurred from the March flood. Either way, the storm’s
magnitude and destructiveness changed perceptions on flood
control. This is illustrated in newspapers articles at the time of the
1938 flood.
News of the flood prompted various newspapers to run
headlines informing their readers of the devastation in southern
87
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California. The New Castle News in New Castle, Pennsylvania ran
a front page headline in bold print “CALIFORNIA HIT BY
FLOOD: Estimate 45 Dead As Waters Sweep Over Part Of
State.”91 Freeport Journal-Standard of Freeport, Illinois headline
in bold writing read “FLOOD LOSS MOUNTS IN
CALIFORNIA,” the article describes the number dead or homeless
and the untold millions in damages.92 The natural disaster even
caused social upheaval. For instance, the San Mateo Times on
March 3 ran a headline “L.A. Looting Starts.”93 Then on March 5,
1938 the headline read “L.A. Issues Orders To Shoot Looters.”94
The same article also describes the problems communities like
Riverside had over contaminated water for drinking purposes and
“stagnant, disease-breeding pools” of water.95 Corroborating the
story, The Hayward Review on the same day ran the headline,
“Disease Perils Flood’s Victims: Town’s Drinking Water
Condemned.”96 Communities were isolated due to the flood. The
Santa Fe Railroad traffic came to a halt because either their tracks
washed away or fell victim to landslides, thus cutting off
supplies.97 Means of communication were severed as power lines
gave way. The devastation felt by southern Californians and
reported through various newspapers across the nation informed
readers of the growing problem of the flood menace in southern
California. The need for a modern flood control system, capable of
withstanding floods like that of March 1938, became imperative.
After the March 1938 Flood: A Lesson Learned
91
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A newspaper in Alberta, Canada, The Lethbridge Herald on March
24, 1938 criticized Los Angeles as having a “lack of flood control”
and moreover argues that; “…monies Los Angeles City and
County will have to find to develop flood control projects to
prevent flood damage in the future!”98 What the article did not say
was that flood control did exist, but was insufficient. The Army
Corps had already began establishing ideas for a comprehensive
flood control system, but in the wake of the March flood they and
other experts realized they had underestimated the extent of
construction projects needed. The Army Corps began to pressure
the federal government to appropriate additional funds for flood
control. On June 28, 1938 Congress modified the Flood Control
Act of 1936 to provide an addition $6,500,000 for a ninth
construction unit that would control floods on the San Antonio and
Chino Creeks.99 Yet, shortly after Congress’s decision the Army
Corps compiled a new report that analyzed the information
gathered from the March flood. Their proposed plan in 1936
proved insufficient. The report reads:
The plan of improvement in the approved project
for San Antonio-Chino Creeks…is the only one in
the Santa Ana River above Prado that is considered
adequate for the flood protection of the areas
subject to damage from floods. The estimates for
all other basin subdivisions considered in this
enclosure are based on the type of structures
considered adequate by local interests prior to the
March 1938 flood. It is evident that these structures
and therefore the respective estimates are
inadequate. A survey will be required to determine
the improvements that should be included in a
comprehensive plan for flood control on the Santa
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Ana River and tributaries, together with estimates of
cost.100
Major Wyman submitted a preliminary report on February 15,
1939, which nearly negated all previous assumptions to provide
adequate flood control. His report explained how the March flood
was a learning lesson for the Army Corps and local water
authorities:
As a result of this flood, local engineers and
interested parties within the basin believe that the
improvements sponsored at the public hearing are
inadequate to provide the desired protection and
that improvements which will provide such
protection would cost considerably more than the
amount estimated [$44,525,600] by them and as
presented at the hearing [February 24, 1938]…
Plans upon which this estimate was based were
prepared by local interests prior to the flood of
March 1938, and as has been explained, local
interests now believe that their original plans would
be inadequate and that the total cost of adequate
improvements would be considerably more than the
amount mentioned above…$69,000,000, it is
believed that most of the improvements desired by
local interests may be warranted.101
However, Major Wyman’s 1936 report “concludes that the
essential features for adequate flood control…can probably be
accomplished within the limits of funds authorized,” $18 million in
total.102 In three years time Major Wyman perspective changed
dramatically. Adequate flood control now “warranted” $69 million
100

“Local Interests,” tab 22, p. 14; Santa Ana River + Tribs., CA 1939 (ENCL.)
[1/5]; box 508; RG 77, NARA.
101
Major Theodore Wyman, “Preliminary Examination Report Flood Control on
Santa Ana River and Tributaries California,” February, 15, 1939, pp.36-37, 3940; Santa Ana River, CA 1937-1939 (ENCL.); box 506; RG 77, NARA.
102
Major Theodore Wyman, Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District, April 15,
1937, “Flood Control Report, Santa Ana River and other streams, for the

132

Adam Scott Miller

to develop flood control structures for the Santa Ana River basin.
Furthermore, local interests realized their estimates fell short for
adequate flood control. The March 1938 flood demonstrated a
change in attitude toward a modern flood control system. Before
1938, it was clear to the people that a flood problem existed. After
March 1938, it was evident that a serious flood problem existed
that would require tens of millions of dollars to correct.
Subsequently, Congress authorized a multitude of appropriations
under Flood Control Act103 after the March flood.104 In the wake
of another disastrous flood in 1969, Congressman, 33rd District
Jerry Pettis wrote in the Montclair Tribune, “The 1938 flood
triggered the construction of $38,700,000 in federal and local
projects in our country, all designed to prevent a repetition of that
disaster.”105 After the March flood the Army Corps quickly began
surveying the land to find new solutions to prevent another
disaster.
Immediately after the storm the Army Corps thoroughly
investigated the extent of the damages from the March flood.106
They took aerial photos, conducted interviews with property
owners, and wrote field surveys to determine the total damages
caused by the flood in addition to studying how floodwaters
behaved. These surveys are evident in the above photographs of
the March flood. Hundreds of additional photos were part of
Major Wyman’s May 28, 1938 report on the March flood. The
preliminary report by Major Wyman in February 1939 outlines the
direct and indirect damages of the March flood and specifies which
tributary caused what damage. This helped the Army Corps
classify which areas were at the greatest risk of destructive damage
protection of the metropolitan area in Orange County, Calif., 1; Santa Ana
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103
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at the time. The most volatile areas affected by floods were
investigated to find solutions to prevent future devastation.
Another important lesson learned was the behavior of water. A
July 1939 report established a conundrum to southern California’s
flood problem. To control floods, construction of additional
channels and storm drains were needed to prevent flooding in
localized areas. However, these channels allowed water to quickly
flow downstream at concentrated levels, straining levies
downstream in Orange County. When a storm’s intensity hits the
hardest it creates a surge of water funneling downstream, resulting
in overflow or broken levies. In support of improved or concrete
lined channels, they allowed the water to move as one continual
mass, which allowed for a smaller storage capacity. In other
words, concrete channels were useful in some places, but not
others. Upstream dams or reservoirs would collect water even
during intense periods to minimize high concentration
downstream. Prado Dam is a key example.
After the March flood, the Army Corps sought out new
locations for dams or reservoirs. In addition to dams and
reservoirs, spreading grounds would also be utilized. Spreading
grounds are located at both the foothill of a mountain and at the
canyon’s mouth. Their purpose is to disperse water as it flowed
out of the canyon mouth, thus slowing down the water’s velocity.
Moreover, spreading grounds could catch much of the debris that
devastated most of the Santa Ana basin community.107 Also,
spreading grounds allowed water to seep underground, which
helped replenish the aquifer. The picture on the next page is an
example of one spreading ground utilized in the Santa Ana River
basin. In today’s standards, spreading grounds require an
enormous amount of valuable land, but their benefits far outweigh
the disadvantages. Thus, spreading grounds act as a buffer during
intense rain periods and help solve
a variety of problems pertaining to debris, floods, and water
conservation. Dams and reservoirs also became a tool of flood
control.
The solution was not as simple as building a concrete
channel or a single dam as the Army Corps first had intended. A
107
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study case was required to comprehend how flooding waters
behave. Then the Army Corps could take their findings and
establish a reliable approach for flood control.
Re-modernization
Development of adequate flood control structures is a learning
process. The Army Corps learned tremendously from the March
1938 flood, but their system was not bullet-proof. In other words,
other floods had to occur to put these improvements to the test.
Besides, Army Corps historian Anthony Turhollow states, “LAD
[Los Angeles District Army Corps] and local agencies have barely
kept pace in providing necessary flood control works to protect the
momentous growth of population and industry in southern
California.”108
In January and February of 1969, two large storms
comparable to the March flood struck the region. Depending on
one’s viewpoint, flood control was either a success or a failure.
The City of Ontario Risk Management report claimed the two
floods created the most damage of any previous flood on record.
Damage in San Bernardino County was estimated at $54 million
and caused at least 13 deaths.109 “Nineteen inches of rain fell in
Ontario over a 24-hour period.”110 For historian Anthony
Turhollow, success or failure of flood control does not depend on
the damages and costs of the flood, but how much money was
saved and damage was prevented as a result of flood control.111
“The system more than paid for itself by preventing more than $1.5
billion in flood damages and preventing the loss of many lives.”112
Former Los Angeles County Board Supervisor Frank G. Bonelli
stressed “in 1969 that ’the overall flood control system prevented
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one of the worst catastrophes in the history of Los Angeles
County.’”113
Today, southern Californian’s experience a near worry free
environment as compared to those who lived here in the early part
of the 20th century. Many residents probably never realized that
southern California has a flood problem. Truth be told, we still do
not understand completely. The Army Corps of Engineers and
local water districts are continually improving flood control.
In 1979, the Army Corps realized flood control was
insufficient on the Santa Ana River. The Prado Dam was targeted
for improvement. Increased urbanization downstream and a
stronger understanding of the Santa Ana basin hydrology led the
Army Corps to conclude, “that a greater degree of protection than
the dam now affords is needed.”114 Their recommendations
required raising the dam by 30 feet and increasing the output
release of water from 5,000 to 30,000 c.f.s.115 The work proposed
in 1979 was finally completed in recent years. Another major
project for the Army Corps of Engineers was the Seven Oaks Dam
in Mentone, CA. The dam is located in the foothills at the canyon
opening of the Santa Ana River. Compared to Prado Dam, the
Seven Oaks Dam dwarfs the 1938 flood control centerpiece. The
Mentone Dam was first mentioned as a future construction
endeavor in 1979 and the Army Corps began construction of the
Seven Oaks Dam (Mentone Dam) in September 1995.116 117
Completed in 2000 the Seven Oaks Dam measures 550 feet high
and 2,980 feet across and was built at a cost of $420 million.118
The Seven Oaks Dam became the centerpiece in a renewed effort
to provide greater protection for the Santa Ana basin community.
Almost $1.4 billion was appropriated in 1986 to re-modernize
flood control along the Santa Ana River and its tributaries.119
113
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Is spending an additional $1.4 billion on flood works’
projects justified? Does the cost outweigh the benefits? For those
who remember 1938, the money was well spent. Just as the March
1938 flood illustrated to the Army Corps the dire need for a serious
approach for flood control, the floods of 1969 demonstrated the
constant need for flood control improvements. The solution
became the $1.4 billion program to prevent possible future loss of
life and damage. Anthony Turhollow indicates the same attitude
toward flood control, “Because floods sometimes do not occur for
a number of successive years, the question of the need for a flood
control system is invariably raised. However, when the inevitable
floods do occur, then public appreciation for the foresight of
engineers is openly and gratefully manifested.”120 The benefits of
flood control are not limited to the protection of life and property,
but are indirectly linked to increased wealth and taxes.
Uncovering the Indirect Benefits of Flood Control
Since adopting a proactive approach to flood control after the
March 1938 flood, southern California’s available land use has
spread remarkably. As discussed earlier, Major Theodore Wyman
introduced the direct and indirect benefits of flood control as a side
note in his April 15, 1937 report. After the completion of the
Army Corps proposed projects, to a certain extent floodwaters
could be contained. Colonel R.C. Hunter in a November 1, 1946
report illustrated that the Army Corps shifted its focus to analyzing
benefits of flood control in addition to flood control improvements.
The report reads:
A study of growth in population and of business and
industrial trends indicated that as a result of future
development the total average value of residential,
business, and industrial property in the overflow
zones during the next 50 years, 1947-96, generally
will increase 50 percent and that the total average
value of highway property and public utilities,
including sewers and water systems, generally will
120
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increase 30 percent. Property values were estimated
on the basis of prewar (1940) conditions. Based on
1946 replacement costs, present property values are
estimated to be from 50 to 100 percent greater than
prewar values. The 1940 true value of nonmilitary
property in the principal overflow zones is
estimated at $167,213,000, including $55,864,000
for residential, business, and industrial property,
$68,080.000 for agricultural property.121
Over time, flood control allowed an increase in property values,
and a corresponding rise in property tax revenue. Local
governments, such as the County of San Bernardino, realized the
positive impacts of flood control. A Board of Supervisors meeting
held on December 22, 1947, urged the federal government to
embark on new flood control improvements. By law, local interests
have to fund a portion of flood control improvements. Yet, the
recorded minutes illustrated that the local interests were willing to
contribute their portion of funds to lure Congress to contribute
monies for new channel improvements:
Minutes of the Board of Supervisors of San
Bernardino County acting as ex-officio Board of
Supervisors of San Bernardino County Flood
Control District” meeting held December 22, 1947.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that, if the above
described channel improvements be authorized by
the said Congress, then the San Bernardino County
Flood Control District, to the best of its ability, will
assist the Federal Government in undertaking said
flood control improvements by assuming the
following obligations, to-wit:
(1) Those non-Federal contributions, which are
required by Federal laws.
(2) In addition---and in recognition that property
values would be increased by the improvement with
121
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increased utilization of the land protected from
flooding --- and if such payment shall be required
by Congress in authorizing the improvement,
contribute $200,000.00 of the first cost of the
project.122
The crucial part of this document is that it does not state that flood
control improvements are for the protection of the residents;
instead the supervisors recognize the land use and property
benefits only. Then the Board entices Congress to appropriate
funds, because they have already agreed to provide the county’s
financial contribution for flood control. As a hypothetical
question, this type of behavior can also breed corruption in local
governments worthy of investigation. If property values are low
because its location is on a floodplain and local officials knowingly
ask for improvements that will undoubtedly increase property
value, one could buy the land cheaply before the flood control
improvements are made and then later and sell it for a substantial
profit.
Examples of increased land use can be seen throughout
southern California. The City of Yorba Linda is a prime example
of floodplain land that is utilized for residential and business use.
Below is an illustration, using Google Earth, of the current
development that has taken place in the City of Yorba Linda. The
other is a photograph that was taken by the Army Corps during the
March 1938 flood. The two are taken from virtually the same
perspective. Compare the Santa Ana River’s size while in flood
and the land developments that have taken place. Clearly, the
untold wealth Major Wyman noted in his April 1937 report was
discovered. Thus, flood control allowed for future developments
on the floodplain creating an immeasurable amount of wealth.
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Figure 11. Image Captured from Google Earth. City of Yorba Linda as of
2010: Note the Arrow pointing to Yorba Bridge. The blue line marks the path
of the Santa Ana River.

Figure 12. Reproduced from the Holdings of the National Archives at
Riverside. Photo taken 3/3/1938. View looking northeast on Santa Ana River.
Note the arrow pointing to Yorba Bridge. Compare the two photos, the size of
the Santa Ana River and permanent developments encroaching on the floodplain
as to agricultural land.
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Conclusion
The question as to whether the region was worth protecting from
flooding might sound superfluous after analyzing flood control on
the Santa Ana River basin. The untold wealth created from
extended land use and the drastic increase in property tax revenue
certainly improved the region. Flood control allowed the region’s
economy to shift from primarily agricultural to industrial. The
defense industry prospered in southern California, bringing with it
skilled workers. In fact because the defense industry was so
critical in southern California flood control became a matter of
national security.123 During World War II, the Cold War, the
Korean War, and Vietnam, the United States relied on southern
California’s defense material and technology output. If a large
flood disrupted the defense industry, it could cripple the U.S.
military and hinder its ability to supply equipment to the troops at
home and abroad.
Of course some criticism arises when discussing flood
control projects. The mere sight of concrete channels and dams
take away from the beauty of the southern California landscape.
Mike Davis’s book, Ecology of Fear, argues that flood control was
a political construct. “The Los Angeles River- the defining
landscape of the nineteenth-century city-was sacrificed for the sake
of emergency work relief, the preservation of industrial land
values, and a temporary abatement of the flood problem.” 124
Moreover, flood control benefited wealthy large landowners who
forced “the natural river into a concrete straitjacket-destroying the
riparian ecology and precluding use of the riverway as a
greenbelt.”125 Inversely, in densely populated, flatland areas such
as Orange County and Los Angeles, unsightly concrete channels
might be the only option to assist water out of the area rapidly. The
debate may still continue today, but after the residents of southern
California and the nation experienced or witnessed the affects of
the March 1938 flood, perceptions changed.
123

Turhollow, 165.
Mike Davis, Ecology of Fear (New York: Metropolitan Books Henry Holt
and Company, 1998), 71.
125
Davis, 69.
124

141

A Watershed Event

The timing of the March flood was critical. Since the
region’s population was large enough to warrant concern about
flood control, yet was not developed to the size of the 1950’s
California, a national calamity was averted. Had the circumstances
been different, the 1938 flood might have done to southern
California what Hurricane Katrina did to New Orleans in 2005.
The March flood marked a turning point in southern California.
Modern flood control began just before an industrial and
population explosion occurred. Those devastated by the flood may
not agree with such a positive outlook, but future residents should
be made aware of California’s natural flooding occurrences. As
historian Anthony Turhollow wrote, another lesson the March
flood provided was the need for a permanent disaster agency. The
dependence on volunteers became outdated. “Plans for an
emergency relief organization began as a result of the 1938 flood
to cope with sightseers and looters, as well as to provide
emergency aid.”126 Only sporadic flooding occurred in the wake of
the major storm that passed through southern California in January
2010. The most severe images reported on television were a
neighborhood in Long Beach submerged in two feet of water:
enough to cause damage, but nothing compared to prior floods.
If comparing rainfall from the past and superimposing it
on the southern California of today, 2010, one wonders what the
possible outcome might be. The rainfall that caused the 1862 flood
caused insignificant damage, but what if that storm occurred in
today’s vastly developed area? The Army Corp believed in the
1940’s that the structures they built could withstand maximum
probable floods. The flood of 1969 proved their calculations
wrong, which then sparked the construction of the Seven Oaks
Dam and increase of the Prado Dam’s overall height. In the past
decade the Inland Empire has grown tremendously. That growth
has caused numerous housing projects and roads covering the bare
ground with asphalt and concrete, furthermore adding sewers and
storm drains that ultimately empty into the Santa Ana River. Since
severe flooding has not occurred in recent decades, as a result of
flood control developments, the population may not be aware of
126

Office of the Chief of Engineers Los Angeles District General Administrative
files 1935-1950 800.73, box 40; RG 77, NARA.

142

Adam Scott Miller

the potential of major rainstorms. Historians need to educate and
remind the community of the region’s past flood disasters.
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Exhibit Reviews
Preserving Local History: The Important Role of the Small
Museum
"Unofficial" McDonald’s Museum and Original Store Site.
Albert Okura, owner and director, San Bernardino, California
Route 66 Museum. Paul Chassey, board of directors, Victorville, California.

Original sign at the first McDonald's Restaurant (personal photo by author)1

The proliferation of historical museums attests to human
fascination with the past and the desire to be in the physical
presence of history. In Southern California, one has access to
numerous large, world-class institutions where stunning collections
are abundant, artfully displayed, and arranged in such a fashion
that a visit feels more like a profound experience. Often
overlooked in the search for cultural experience and historical
preservation is the small museum, which plays a role in the
community that a larger institution cannot attempt. In the area of
1

All photos of the McDonald's Museum taken by the author and printed with
permission from Jack Markus.
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greater San Bernardino, California, a handful of these little
attractions are working to diligently preserve and promote local
history, providing a common ground for the surrounding
communities to come together, and greatly enhancing the cultural
landscape.
One such institution engaged in this noble pursuit is the
Unofficial McDonald’s Museum on E Street in downtown San
Bernardino. Built on the site of the original McDonald’s
Hamburgers restaurant, which opened in 1948, the unassuming
building boasts the large sign that drew customers into the first
drive-through establishment beginning in 1953. Though the
building itself is not original, as the restaurant was torn down in
1972, it marks the very spot where the birth of a pop culture icon
and the fast food industry took place. Inside, visitors find a
veritable mountain of material, including photos, retired
playground equipment, advertising signage, Happy Meal toys, and
literature. As is often the case with small institutions such as this,
every available corner and surface is utilized to display the
abundant artifacts.

"Unofficial" McDonald's Museum (personal photo by author)

The site was purchased in 1998 by Albert Okura, owner of
the local chicken restaurant chain, Juan Pollo. According to Jack
Marcus, the Juan Pollo product developer and animator who runs
the museum part-time, Okura admired the tenacity and business
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plans of the restaurant’s founders, the McDonald brothers, and Ray
Kroc, who purchased the chain and created the corporation that
remains in place today.2 However, Okura’s museum must be
careful to make clear that it is not associated or affiliated with the
McDonald’s Corporation, and it is actually regularly monitored to
make sure this condition is upheld.3 In spite of this restriction,
there is no denying the importance of the site to the history of San
Bernardino, and Markus is actively involved in keeping that
history alive. He listens intently to the personal stories of people
who remember the original restaurant and then relates those same
stories to other visitors to the museum, displaying the characteristic
back and forth exchange of culture and information distinctive of a
small, local institution. He states that, in this way, he is able to
impart information that many people have never heard and may
find surprising, such as the fact that the original McDonald's BBQ
restaurant of 1948 was staffed by carhops who were always
attractive, young females that carried bottles of white shoe polish
with them to keep their work boots looking spotless.4

Signage outside the Route 66 Museum in Victorville, California (personal photo
by author)5

The birthplace of the iconic fast food giant draws visitors
from all over the world on a regular basis, showing that the
museum is much more than a simple piece of kitschy Americana.
2

Personal Communication, Jack Marcus to Jennifer Ferguson, May 8, 2010.
Personal Communication, Jack Marcus to Jennifer Ferguson, May 8, 2010.
4
Personal Communication, Jack Marcus to Jennifer Ferguson, May 8, 2010.
5
All photos of the Route 66 Museum taken by the author and printed with
permission from Paul Chassey.
3
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As well, its simultaneous popularity with locals belies its function
as a source of local history, pride, and community. Markus notes
the institution’s “open-door policy” despite its residence in a part
of the city known for a fairly high level of crime, and states that
Okura would not charge a fee for admission “out of respect” for
both the community and the men who made the location famous.6
It is this level of bravery and esteem for one's neighbors that makes
the “unofficial” McDonald’s museum a local treasure and provides
a cultural “common ground” on which the diverse populations of
the greater San Bernardino area can come together and celebrate
that which has shaped the area and its residents.
The growth of the first McDonald’s restaurant was partially
contingent upon its location on Route 66, which channeled
travelers through downtown San Bernardino, and this connection is
evident in the small section in the museum’s rear that showcases
Route 66 memorabilia as part of its permanent collection. One
cannot escape the influence of the Mother Road in San Bernardino
and the surrounding communities, and a short trip north into the
High Desert warrants a visit to the Route 66 Museum in
Victorville, California. This small institution is also a free
attraction filled with local artifacts, though its focus is entirely on
the influence and legacy of Route 66.
Celebrating its fifteenth anniversary this year (2010), the
Route 66 Museum boasts a diverse, eclectic collection and a
clientele that travels from all over the world to learn about the
history of the famous route. Board of Directors member Paul
Chassey estimates that around ninety percent of the total visitors
are non-locals, with fifty to sixty percent of those non-locals
coming from outside the United States.7 When they arrive, patrons
are treated to a visual representation of the Mother Road and how
it shaped the greater San Bernardino area, particularly the High
Desert. Road and advertising signs adorn all available wall spaces,
numerous artifacts sit neatly in glass cases, and many larger items
are unencumbered by enclosures and thus available for closer
scrutiny.

6
7

Personal Communication, Jack Marcus to Jennifer Ferguson, May 8, 2010.
Personal Communication, Paul Chassey to Jennifer Ferguson, May 13, 2010.
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Route 66 Museum in Victorville, California (personal photo by author)

In a place such as California, which Chassey feels is
"notorious for tearing things down," he states that the museum's
main goal is to save whatever it can for the benefit of future
generations.8 When there are large historical pieces they are
unable to save, such as buildings, the museum endeavors to
document such artifacts in pictures and written descriptions. In
this way, they are preserving as much history as they possibly can,
and providing the community with a sense of its origins and its
importance. It is likely that, in their absence, much of the cultural
artifacts and knowledge that they have accumulated would have
been lost forever. Despite their considerable contribution to the
community, the Victorville Route 66 Museum faces several
challenges with regard to finances, community support, and
adequate numbers of volunteers.9 Hopefully the museum can
continue to achieve its goal and survive, as its presence in the High
Deserts constitutes fully half of the area's museums.
Both the Route 66 Museum and the McDonald's Museum
boast a relaxed and friendly atmosphere that is common to small
institutions of local history. The experiences of visitors are more
personal and individual than is usually possible at a larger, forprofit museum thanks to passionate staff members and selfproclaimed goals of community service and education. What these
institutions may lack in polish and prestige is more than
compensated for by their distinctiveness and personality. Their
8
9

Personal Communication, Paul Chassey to Jennifer Ferguson, May 13, 2010.
Personal Communication, Paul Chassey to Jennifer Ferguson, May 13, 2010.
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efforts are preserving local history, both for residents and visitors,
and give the residents of the greater San Bernardino area a cultural
anchor to strengthen their senses of self and their relationships with
each other. If you are searching for something fulfilling,
interesting, and inexpensive to do close to home, consider
patronizing one of the small, local museums in your area. You
never know what you might discover.
Jennifer Ferguson
California State University, San Bernardino
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Greater San Bernardino Area Museums
"Unofficial" McDonald’s Museum
and
Original Restaurant Site
1398 North E Street
San Bernardino, CA 92405
(909) 885-6324
Route 66 Museum
16825 South D Street
Victorville CA 92393
(760) 951-0436
www.califrt66museum.org
Robert V. Fullerton Art Museum
California State University, San
Bernardino
5500 University Parkway
San Bernardino, CA 92407
(909) 537-7373
museum.csusb.edu
A Special Place Children's
Museum
1003 East Highland Avenue
San Bernardino, CA 92404
(909) 881-1201
Redlands Historical Glass Museum
1157 Orange Street
Redlands, CA 92373
(909) 798-0868
www.historicalglassmuseum.com

Lincoln Memorial Shrine
125 West Vine Street
Redlands, CA 92373
(909) 798-7636
www.lincolnshrine.org
California Museum of
Photography
University of California,
Riverside
3824 Main Street
Riverside, CA 92501
(951) 827-4787
www.cmp.ucr.edu
Harrison Exhibit Center
16367 Main Street
Hesperia, CA 92345
(760) 244-5488
San Bernardino History &
Railroad Museum
1170 West 3rd Street
San Bernardino, CA 92408
(909) 537-7373
Victor Valley Museum &
Art Gallery
11873 Apple Valley Road
Apple Valley, CA 92307
(760) 240-2111
www.vvmuseum.com
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Art, Activism, Access: 40 Years of Ethnic Studies at UCLA.
Fowler Museum, UCLA.
Marla C. Berns, director; Betsy Quick, director of Education; Sebastian Clough,
director of Exhibitions. February 28, 2010-June 13, 2010.

The city of Los Angeles is known for its ethnically diverse
population. Consequently, L.A. has often been a focal point for
discussions regarding ethnicity. It seems appropriate, therefore,
that the exhibit, Art, Activism, Access: 40 Years of Ethnic Studies
at UCLA should detail the history – as the title suggests – of ethnic
studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. The exhibit is
part of the 2009-2010 celebration of forty years of ethnic studies at
UCLA. The purpose of the exhibit is to present the history of
ethnic studies at UCLA to a general audience of museum patrons.1
The exhibit’s history begins in 1969, when social tensions
created by the Civil Rights Movement increased public demand for
an ethnic studies program at UCLA. UCLA Chancellor Charles
Young established the university’s four ethnic studies centers in
response to this demand. These were among the first ethnic studies
programs in the United States. The four centers – the Asian
American Studies Center, American Indian Studies Center, Bunche
Center for African American Studies, and the Chicano Studies
Research Center – were established in order to study issues facing
ethnic minorities and to raise public awareness regarding these
issues.
Art, Activism, Access: 40 Years of Ethnic Studies at UCLA
is a collaborative effort between the four ethnic studies centers, the
UCLA Institute of American Cultures, and the Fowler Museum at
UCLA. The wide variety of artifacts and images on display in the
exhibit are testaments to the depth of interdepartmental
cooperation; each of the four ethnic studies centers’ archives
provided books, films, journals, murals, newspapers, photographs
and many other materials for exhibition.
1

Betsy Quick, interview by author, by phone, April 27, 2010.
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The exhibit is situated in a spacious room adjacent to the
museum courtyard. A room-sized display case in the center loosely
divides the exhibit into four sections representing the ethnic studies
centers. Immediately upon entering the exhibit, patrons will see a
glass case containing newspaper articles detailing the founding of
UCLA’s ethnic studies program.
The exhibit uses such primary written materials to narrate
its complex history. Interspersed throughout the exhibit are glass
cases displaying newspaper articles, academic journals and books.
One campus newspaper recounts UCLA students’ reaction against
the 1996-1997 state legislation curtailing affirmative action in
California. Another article describes the American Indian
Movement’s (AIM) occupation of Alcatraz Island in 1969. The
written materials are not presented in chronological order, but
patrons who circle the room and read each exhibition will gain a
broad idea of the exhibit’s history. A limitation on some written
materials is their relative inaccessibility. Many texts are closed and
neatly shelved inside glass display cabinets, leaving patrons to
infer content from book titles. Without accessibility, these
particular texts do not contribute to the exhibit’s history in a
significant way.
Despite its reliance on primary written sources, the exhibit
does not neglect other sources of media. In terms of visual media,
the exhibit showcases a variety of material, including three large
murals. Two fourteen-year-old students attending a summer
session at UCLA painted one of these murals around 1970. This
untitled mural depicts the ethnic pride and solidarity of a black
community.
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Untitled, 1971. Los Angeles, CA. Mural by Richard Wyatt and Guillermo
Anderson. Photograph courtesy of Stacey Abarbanel.

The exhibit effectively uses its vibrant and evocative visual
media to supplement its history. An example of this historical
narration using visual media can be seen in the photo series, “Life
in a Day in Black L.A.”, which documents the grim repercussions
of the Los Angeles Riots in 1992 for L.A.’s black communities.
The exhibit also makes effective use of visual media using
film. Most of the exhibit’s films are displayed in two media centers
containing a total of seven televisions. Patrons are free to watch
clips from films such as Marco Williams’ “In Search of Our
Fathers,” Duane Kubo and Robert Nakamura’s “Hito Hata: Raise
the Banner,” as well as other documentaries. The use of film is
limited by the fact that only one pair of headphones is available per
television. This discourages groups from watching the same film
simultaneously. This is only a minor limitation; the films provide a
human voice to the exhibit, even when viewed by one person at a
time.
The exhibit’s overall presentation is exceptional; it
balances artistic materials with written materials, thus patrons are
exposed to both the cultural and academic accomplishments of the
ethnic studies centers. The exhibit does not, however, leave patrons
with a clear idea as to the impact of UCLA’s research. After forty
years of ethic study, what can UCLA tell Americans about where
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ethnic minorities stand today? The answer is inconclusive, but the
history presented at the exhibit suggests that progress has been
made. UCLA’s campus newspaper, The Daily Bruin, explains the
exhibit’s lack of closure in quoting Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, vice
chancellor of the UCLA graduate division: “We need to be aware
that the struggle is not complete. We all wish for a more just
society … This [the exhibit] represents to many of us the
contributions we have made towards that end.”2

Education Through Struggle, 1995. Los Angeles, CA. Mural by Darryl Mar and
students. Photograph courtesy of Stacey Abarbanel.

UCLA’s exhibi, Art, Activism, Access: 40 Years of Ethnic
Studies at UCLA, accomplishes its stated goal; it successfully
presents the history of ethnic studies at UCLA. The largest flaw in
the exhibit is in the history it covers. UCLA’s research on the
political and social struggles of ethnic minorities is ongoing, thus
the exhibit feels incomplete. In other words, the exhibit tells an
unfinished story. Despite minor issues in presentation, the exhibit
makes excellent use of its materials to tell this unfinished story.
Chris Moreland
California State University, San Bernardino

2

Aly Holmes, “Exhibit Honors UCLA Ethnic Studies,” The Daily Bruin,
February 26, 2010, under “A&E,”
http://www.dailybruin.com/articles/2010/2/26/exhibit-honors-ucla-ethnicstudies/ (accessed May 12, 2010).
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Home Lands: How Women Made the West
CAROLYN BRUCKER and VIRGINIA SCHARFF, curators. Autry National
Center of the American West April 16 – August 22, 2010.
Companion Volume: Home Lands: How Women Made the West by VIRGINIA
SCHARFF and CAROLYN BRUCKER Berkeley: University California Press,
2010.

When we think of women in the old west we think of the rugged
and brave pioneer wife or perhaps the clever and spiritual Native
American woman. But do we ever consider women in the old West
as doctors, mayors, authors or builders? As we move beyond the
stereotypical Little House on the Prairie and Pocahontas, we
uncover a rich and diverse history of women in the West shaped by
the choices they have made, each individual and remarkable in its
own right.
Home Lands exhibit at the Autry National Center offers
the visitor a unique perspective on how women have shaped the
west based on their choices as providers and leaders. The exhibit
focuses on three themes that have integrally influenced the lives of
women in the West: earth, transportation and water. To highlight
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the themes, three regions in the west were chosen as focal points
for the exhibit: northern New Mexico for earth, the Colorado Front
Range for transportation and Puget Sound, Washington for water.
Patrons are exposed to a multitude of mediums including vision,
sound, and tactile experience that delight the senses and inspire the
mind.
On the day of my visit to the museum the exhibit halls were
full of people, men and women, all from different ethnic
backgrounds, each one admiring this unique perspective of
women’s history. One of the curator’s goals in designing the
exhibit was to create a space that would appeal to a wide audience
range.1
Earth
Entering the exhibit hall the smell of wood hits your olfactory
sense from the simple peg board that displays the title of the
exhibit. Dr Brucken, one of the curators, explains that simple,
home materials that would be accessible to women were the
inspiration behind the entrance wall and all of the walls in the
exhibit.2 Moving on, the visitor sees an immense wall covered in
corn husks, underneath of which is displayed a massive grinding
stone and pottery of the southwest, handmade from the earth by
women. This area brings the visitor right into two main themes of
the exhibit: home and the earth. In a side room, a visitor can sit and
enjoy a projection of the stories of one woman’s experience as a
mixed-blood woman growing up in the southwest—read from her
diary by her granddaughter—which celebrates the diversity and
rich culture of the region. The room’s walls are made of burlap,
purposely wrinkled to create texture and bring it to life. Along a
large wall in the back of the exhibit area, a mural celebrates the
twentieth century generations of women of the southwest. Dr.
Brucken pointed out that instead of creating a handrail to protect
the mural, a floor mosaic made of multi colored corn spells out
“Earth remained a potent symbol for twentieth century New
1
2

Interview and tour of the exhibit with Dr Carolyn Brucken May 11, 2010.
Interview and tour of the exhibit with Dr Carolyn Brucken May 11, 2010.
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Mexican women” and keeps the visitors at a safe distance, while
adding living texture.
One aspect of the exhibit was particularly challenging:
how to display books in an interesting way that could create an
interactive space for the visitor. The result is ingenious: a wall of
glass encases the books, each with their own microphone sticking
out with the voices of women reading from the text. As part of the
same exhibit, the cookbooks of Fabiola Cabeza de Baca, an
independent southwestern author, educator, and home economist
who lived from 1894 to 1991, are displayed while her voice is
projected through a special speaker hanging from the ceiling. This
speaker is made specifically to optimize a woman’s voice range.
On one of the walls in this section is a rope, along which visitors
are encouraged to hang their favorite foods or recipes from safety
pins. Alive with texture, sound and color, the southwest area of the
exhibit brings the visitor closer to the earth and home.
Transportation
As the visitor enters the next section, the Colorado Front Range,
the eyes are immediately drawn to the mustard-yellow life size
figure of a Native American woman elevated on a horse. Behind
her, small lights hang in the distance across the room while strips
of blue dyed cloth flutter on the wall creating the illusion of a sky.
This section highlights women on the move and change in the 19th
and early 20th century. The visitor is struck by the manner in which
transportation changed the way of life for women via horses, the
railroad, and automobiles. The exhibit tells the story of Owl
Woman, a Native American girl who went to live at an American
fort, and it even displays her tea set; immediately upsetting the
normal images of a Native American’s home. Moving on, the
visitor also learns about Dr Justina Ford, the first female African
American doctor in the late nineteenth century, Colorado.
One of the more popular interactive areas on the day I
visited was a wall of rear-view mirrors with air fresheners hanging
from them. Guests are allowed to write sayings on the air
fresheners. Another striking feature of this area is the contrast
between old and modern. The curators wanted to emphasize how
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the landscape and women’s experience has changed with each
stage of transportation progress. Yet another important theme in
this section shows how spaces have changed from the flat expanse
of the prairies to the rectilinear spaces that occupy the landscape
now with roadways and housing developments.
Water
Moving from the plains to the lush, damp region of the Puget
Sound the exhibit takes us into the importance of water in
women’s lives, from producing income in the form of fishing and
farming, to energy. Electricity in the form of hydropower
transformed the lives of women through modern conveniences
such as washing machines and vacuum cleaners. The navy is also
highlighted in this section, as well as the women working in
canneries. Telephone receivers allow the visitors to listen to the
stories of one woman’s experience as a Japanese immigrant in the
Puget Sound. Another important theme in this area is how women
from many different cultures co-existed. From Scandinavian
immigrants to Japanese immigrants, the Northwest was a melting
pot of independent women on the cutting edge of technology.
Seattle was also home to the first female mayor in the United
States and this area tells her story. The wall treatment in this area
is can lids to represent the industry that allowed independence for
many women in the Northwest region.
Home Lands is a beautifully unusual exhibit displaying
different and lesser known aspects of women’s lives in the west.
The exhibit artfully employs various mediums that are fun and
accessible for people of any gender and age. The goals of the
curators have been masterfully met, even if a person is unaware of
the underlying themes, the exhibit allows the patron to immerse
themselves into the themes using the senses, so that the patron
walks away with the sense that their understanding of women’s
experience in the west has been transformed, if even just a little.
Oceana Collins
California State University, San Bernardino
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